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Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XV

By Kris Millegan

EndgamePart Two

Maybe this [Watergate] is like the Old Testament. It was visited upon us and maybe were going to benefit from it.
                                                                  – Nelson Rockefeller, July 17, 1973


From, Gerald Colby’s, Thy Will Be Done:

The Return Of Richard Nixon

High above New York's Fifth Avenue, in an apartment just a few floors beneath Nelson Rockefellers luxurious three-story penthouse, Richard Nixon was making a decision about 1968. He had been carefully laying the foundation for this campaign ever since he moved to New York in 1963 to join the Mudge, Rose law firm. He had become involved with a new financial group, organized around the mutual funds and railroad fortune of Alan and Fred Kirby of Texas and their allies, including Donald Kendall, head of PepsiCo. Nixon was now on the boards of six companies, where he rubbed shoulders for the first time with the Eastern Establishment in its own lair. [emphasis added]

Even though he had lost his races for the presidency in 1960 and California's governorship in 1962, Nixon continued to play the loyal Republican. Even during the 1964 Goldwater debacle, he traveled the rubber-chicken circuit, boosting local candidates and collecting IOUs in the process. He did the same in 1966. Now he was ready.

So were a large number of Republican moneymen.

Nixon's globe-trotting in the Kendalls' jet on behalf of Pepsi Co’s international sales expansion and his success in promoting Pepsi franchises-including those in Saigon and Bangkok-earned him high marks on Wall Street and a regular six-figure income. It also convinced many business leaders that Nixon was a suitable safe alternative to the besieged Lyndon Johnson. [emphasis added]

Nixon was not only a political alternative to Johnson; he was also a means of escape from the scandals and indiscretions surrounding Johnson. Foremost was the famous Bobby Baker scandal, which had erupted during the Kennedy administration when Attorney General Robert Kennedy conducted a bribery investigation against Johnson’s former Senate aide. Baker's ties to land-development schemes involving Texas oil moneymen surfaced during the investigation. In October 1963, the U.S. Senate began holding hearings on the scandal. Some of the same Texans had been named in Senate Rules Committee hearings in connection with payoffs and loans to Baker in a land-development scheme tied to Jimmy Hoffa's Teamster Pension Fund. Johnson had cause to worry that his name would be smeared, and he was not the only one. Years later, it was revealed that one of the Texas real estate firms active in the Dallas-Fort Worth area in 1963 – a firm that was partly owned by the family of Bedford Wynne, one of the named "Bobby Baker set" – had a second controlling interest: the Rockefeller family through Rockefeller Center, Inc., the Manhattan real estate firm now owned by Nelson and his brothers, the Rockefellers had become partners with the Wynne family in the Great Southwest Corporation.

Should Robert Kennedy run for president and be elected, there was the likelihood of renewed federal investigations of organized crime and of Baker and those linked to him. Who knew where this could lead? Lyndon Johnson, his power wrecked on the shoals of Vietnam, could not protect his friends or even himself. The movement of conservative Texas money toward Richard Nixon took on the appearance of a stampede. Some leading figures, like Governor John Connally, eventually would follow the herd right out of the Democratic party.

Of great importance to Nixon was the backing of Barry Goldwater, rendered publicly as early as 1965. This backing brought in Christian Fundamentalists and the money behind Fundamentalism. Both the new money and the old money had a symbolic center in Billy Graham. Graham's ministry, in turn, offered Nixon a mass base of conservative, middle-of-the-road voters.

In January 1968, Richard Nixon decided to move beyond his preoccupation with courting the Goldwater ultraconservative wing and to begin capturing the moderately conservative center by inviting Billy Graham to his Florida home Nixon asked for Graham's help in deciding whether to run. Graham had known Nixon since the 1950s. They were golfing buddies. Both were hawkish on Vietnam, although Nixon hoped that those who were tired of the war would support him over Johnson. An endorsement from Billy Graham, a registered conservative Democrat, would be a hard blow to Johnson.

Graham prayed, and Nixon joined in. Graham read the Bible, and Nixon read it, too. They watched football. But still no word from Graham about the race. Finally, as Graham prepared to depart, Nixon's patience ran out. "You still haven't told me what I ought to do," he said. Graham turned back, a smile on his face. "Well, if you don't run, you'll always wonder," he said.

Nixon had no intention of wondering. With Graham's support, God would appear to be on his side.

Rockefeller’s conversation with Johnson that day in the Oval Office was kept "off the record," but Nelson had a press conference afterward in the White House’s West Lobby He was the first candidate to resume campaigning after Kennedy’s death, and the White House setting gave every indication of the president's blessing. "I requested a meeting with the President so that, as a result of last week’s tragedy, we discussed the role of a candidate in assisting to bring the kind of stability and healing of wounds and division which exist in this country." Having proclaimed himself a national healer, he already spoke like a president-elect. “I spent quite a lot of time with the President alone. Then Secretary Rusk, General Wheeler [chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Rostow came in. We spent two hours on the situation at home and abroad."

Asked if there would be any changes in his campaign, Nelson managed to tie personal courage to support for the war in Vietnam. "No … If democracy is to stay alive and strong, then there can be no timidity.… There are some 500,000 Americans fighting on the front in Southeast Asia, some 20,000 have given their lives; and I don't think it is for us at home who are trying to represent the forces of democracy in the heart of the nation to cringe from risks."

Then he revealed his campaign strategy Asked if Kennedy's death had changed the political picture for the Republicans, Nelson nodded. "I think … the shock and sorrow will be reflected in a changed mood, that the bridges which he built to our groups who have not shared largely in the American way of life are going to be bridges which will influence both those who are in these groups and the rest of this country.

Nelson offered Kennedy’s Senate seat to two liberals, albeit Republican liberals, in the Kennedy maverick vein: New York Mayor John Lindsay, who declined, and then Rep. Charles Goodell, who accepted. He then appointed the former California chair of "People for Kennedy" and a close friend of the Kennedys, Mrs. Thomas Braden, to lead a national "People for Rockefeller" organization. "Most of the people I know who were for Robert F Kennedy are now for Nelson A. Rockefeller," she explained. "Some are still too stunned to do much but those who can will help Governor Rockefeller." She was not quoted as mentioning her husband's debt to Nelson for a loan that helped him buy a California newspaper.

To launch his 66,000-mile blitzkrieg around the country, Nelson headed for Braden country, Los Angeles. For the first time he included Watts in his itinerary "I think the people who supported Bobby Kennedy are going to come to me now," he told his staff, and he instructed them to begin all speeches on the West Coast with a tribute to Kennedy. But the speeches should not be too introspective. "I don't want any of that sick society stuff. A few nuts don't reflect the state of the country," he insisted. The United States had better stop "looking backward" on past tragedies and mistakes and get beyond such "negative thinking.” California Governor Ronald Reagan's claim that the assassination was the result of a growing attitude of permissiveness by the nation's courts and leaders might have contained a kernel of truth for New York's "Get Tough on Crime" governor. Nelson could not accept Billy Graham's belief that the shooting was symbolic of world moral and spiritual decline or Eugene McCarthys belief that the United States bore too great a burden of guilt for the kind of neglect that had allowed the disposition of violence to grow in the country Nelson Rockefeller was bullish about America and still the perennial optimist about his own political ambitions.

He could pull together minorities, liberals, and youths into a new Rockefeller coalition, he confided to his antiwar son, Steven. He believed he could "get the nomination by a great public outcry." Steven explained later. "Going to the people is his thing; he loves the applause. Going to the delegates was not his thing." And in the end, that was his undoing. If average Republican delegates were anything in 1968, they were not minorities, not liberals, not youths.

And Nelson Rockefeller was not Robert Kennedy. Henry Kissinger's plan for withdrawal from Vietnam and his constant efforts to make Nelson's confusing statements come out sounding right did not create the excitement that Kennedy's clean break with Johnson had.

Rockefeller by now had adopted the Kennedy style of plunging recklessly into crowds, pumping hands, and losing cuff links. Desperate to win over Kennedy's Latino supporters in Texas, Florida, and California, he played his Latin American ties to the hilt. He often spoke in Spanish at such events. But by the end of July, it was clear to the country that Rockefeller's Kennedy style was not Kennedy substance.

His "New Leadership versus Old Politics" theme fell flat with both voters and delegates, especially when they looked at who was backing him. These backers were no populist mavericks like those who had backed Kennedy. These were millionaire businessmen, men like David and Winthrop's real estate partner, Trammel Crow; luxury department store owner Stanley Marcus; Du Pont family in-law Baron Kidd; and chemical scion A. Felix du Pont, Jr.

In the waning days of the campaign, with the Republican Convention in Miami just a week away, the Miami Herald prematurely released a Gallup poll showing that Nixon could do better than Rockefeller against Humphrey or McCarthy. "Nixon or John Mitchell must have gotten to Gallup," Rockefeller said. He knew all about the use of polls in psychological warfare, and Gallup was suspect as a "born-again Christian." So he responded in kind, leaking a Harris poll that showed himself the victor. Then he repeated this maneuver by releasing a poll taken by his own campaign staff after the convention had begun. But it did no good.

Rockefeller lost on the first ballot, 277 votes to Nixon's 692. His last campaign to win the White House he coveted all his life was over.

It was a terrible shock to his sense of self-worth. He flew back to New York, comforting his backers with a typical self-effacing apology "You were fine. I just wasn't good enough. I let you down."

Even Humphrey's offer later that month to share the Democratic ticket as the vice presidential nominee did not soften the blow. "Franklin Roosevelt wanted me to be a Democrat (back in the 1940s). It was too late." He had cast his lot: Win or lose, Nelson Rockefeller would die a member of the Republican Party.

Nelson spent the months up to election day quietly betraying Lyndon Johnson. After Nixon's nomination, he had offered the services of his top foreign policy aide, Henry Kissinger, to the Nixon camp. Kissinger, for his part, remained privately bitter about Nixon, but to Nixon's face the Rockefeller camp stayed on the track of party loyalty, even to the point of betraying Lyndon Johnson's trust.

The First October Surprise

Nelson Rockefeller wanted a seat in Nixon's cabinet. And Nixon wanted to be president. Building a bridge between the two goals was Kissinger's job.

Kissinger had had Johnson's confidence since 1967, when Kissinger approached Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, offering to engage in secret shuttle diplomacy to Paris to see if the North Vietnamese were ready to talk. Because they were planning the Tet Offensive, they were not. Nevertheless, Kissinger's hard work and discretion convinced Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance that he could be trusted. That trust would cost the Democrats the White House.

In the weeks immediately foll0wing the Democratic and Republican conventions, the Paris peace talks were on hold. Saigon refused to consider the participation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in a new coalition government in exchange for peace. Johnson's continued bombing of Vietnam, meanwhile, only deepened Hanoi's resolve to keep fighting. After much discussion, McNamara's replacement as defense secretary, Clark Clifford, came up with a new, two-track approach: the United States would deal directly with North Vietnam and let the Saigon-NLF dispute be approached on a separate track of negotiations. Johnson thought it over.

On September 17, the same day Johnson OK'd Clifford's approach, Henry Kissinger arrived in Paris. Two days later, Averell Harriman arrived, with the news that he had a breakthrough in the peace talks: Johnson had agreed to halt the bombing without Hanoi's having to commit itself first to stopping the war. Serious negotiations could now begin. What was crucial was to keep the Republicans from getting wind of this new stance and any agreement with Hanoi to prevent them from urging the Saigon regime to resist.

It was at this time that Kissinger visited Harriman's aide in Paris, Daniel Davidson, and dined with Harriman's deputy, Cyrus Vance. Davidson, who knew only that "something was going on" with Harriman and Vance, spoke freely with Kissinger, encouraged by Kissinger’s confiding that "six days a week I'm for Hubert, but on the seventh day, I think they're both awful.” Kissinger promised to make Davidson his deputy if he got any post in Humphrey’s administration or in Nixon's.

What he did not tell Davidson was that he was secretly informing on the negotiations to the Nixon campaign staff "I knew that Rockefeller had been offering Kissinger's assistance and urging that I make use of it ever since the convention," Nixon later wrote in his memoirs. "I told [H. R.] Haldeman that [campaign manager John] Mitchell should continue as liaison with Kissinger and that we should honor his desire to keep his role completely confidential,

Mitchell, too, was sure that Nelson Rockefeller was the prime mover: "I thought Henry was doing it because Nelson wanted him to. Nelson asked Henry to help and he did."

In late September, Kissinger, now back from Paris, reported the dreaded news that "there is a better than even chance that Johnson will order a bombing halt at approximately mid-October."

"Our source," Haldeman cryptically told Nixon, "is extremely concerned about the moves Johnson may take and expects that he will take some action before the direction." On October 12, three days after Harriman made another breakthrough in Paris, Kissinger called Nixon staffer Richard Allen to warn of a likely development before October 23 and that there was "more to this than meets the eye.

This was exactly the kind of ominous impression that Harriman and Clifford did not want to convey to Saigon. And that was exactly what the Nixon campaign passes on to Saigon through an old political friend of Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller, Anna Chennault. * [*Chennault, a founder of the "China Lobby" that had backed Chiang Kai-shek, was the widow of General Claire Chennault, the founder of Civil Air Transport (CAT), the CIA’s airline in Southeast Asia. CAT was the CIA airline that Harper Woodward, a top Rockefeller aide, was a director of during the year Nelson oversaw covert operations as Eisenhower's special assistant on Cold War strategy.]

By passing on state secrets that involved the lives of American soldiers, Kissinger was risking possible federal prosecution. He had also compromised any future Nixon administration. "My attitude was that it was inevitable that Kissinger would have to be part of our administration," Richard Allen later concluded. The Nixon staff knew that it was "a pretty dangerous thing for him to be screwing around with the national security.

The same could have been said for the Nixon campaign. Warned by an excited Kissinger just twelve hours before the announcement of the bombing halt that Harriman and Vance had "broken open the champagne," believing they had gotten Saigon's approval to participate in the negotiations, the Nixon campaign leaked the news to Saigon hardliners. That day, General Thieu, the president in Saigon, announced he would not participate in the talks. The agreement collapsed. The war would go on for six more years; as many Americans would die in Vietnam during this period as had died there before.

Hubert Humphrey's campaign, riding the crest of the negotiations' progress and sustained now by his belated break with Johnson's escalation, had come to within one point of overtaking Nixon, thanks to Nixon's own intransigence on Vietnam. But the collapse of the negotiations hurt him.

Johnson had received CIA reports that pointed to a security leak in Paris through the Nixon camp and Mrs. Chennault to Saigon. But Johnson could not get proof and feared exposing intelligence sources or discrediting his administration with unsubstantiated charges. Besides, angry with Humphrey's defection from his war policies, Johnson had lost any interest in helping him.

Rockefeller expected his reward: perhaps a seat in the new Nixon cabinet. To the press he had speculated that he was interested in only the State Department or the Defense Department; the Departments of Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, or even the Treasury had little attraction for him. On September 25, he convened his aides, including Kissinger for a luncheon meeting in Manhattan to ponder the question of which seat he should take if one was offered. There was a phone call from Dwight Chapin Nixon’s appointments secretary.

But the call was for Kissinger, not for Rockefeller. When Kissinger returned, the group took up Rockefeller's role in a Nixon cabinet "as if nothing had happened. No one at the lunch," Kissinger later recalled, "could conceive that the purpose of the call would be to offer me a major position in the new Administration.

No one, that is, except Kissinger, who had discussed the possibility of the position of national security adviser shortly after the Republican Convention.

And Richard Nixon. The idea of looking across the Cabinet Room table at Nelson Rockefeller did not appeal to him at all. "At Treasury, what about David Rockefeller?" William Safire asked Nixon, when the cabinet was being selected. "No, you can't have two Rockefellers in the Cabinet," Safire concluded.

"Is there a law," asked Nixon, "that you have to have one?"

In the end, Rockefeller was told by Nixon that he would be of better service to the country as a governor than as a cabinet member. Yet, even Richard Nixon would finally have to bend before the Rockefellers' special place in U.S. relations with Latin America. In confronting the vast market potential and the mounting rebellions south of the Rio Grande, there simply was no way to avoid Nelson Rockefeller.



To be continued …

Written by watergateexposed   


Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XIV

By Kris Millegan

Endgame – Part One

Ever since I was a kid. After all, when you think of what I had, what else was there to 
aspire to?
                                                                             – Nelson Rockefeller, January 1964


Just how close did Nelson get to his aspiration? A heartbeat away …as the saying goes.

And he didn’t even have to get elected? He was appointed, because of the 25th Amendment of the US Constitution, which had been approved some seven years earlier in 1967. Introduced as a bill by Indiana’s freshman senator, Birch Bayh (who voted against confirming Nelson for veep), the legislation passed with Nelson’s “silent” help:

“… I asked that a comprehensive proposal by New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller be included in the record. Even though this proposal represented a distinct departure from our consensus, I had some regrets that it had to be presented in writing, not in person. The Governor would have been a glamorous witness, bringing to our hearings much of the press attention that I felt we needed to keep our work before the public eye. Earlier, Ken Keating, as a senator from New York, had approached me to suggest that his governor testify in person, as he was eminently qualified to do so since he and his staff had given long and deep study to the problems of disability and succession"
                                                                                                               – Birch Bayh, One Heartbeat Away, 1968

After divorcing his wife in 1962, Nelson endured the sniping that appeared to keep his presidential hopes beyond his reach. For years he vacillated from running, to not running. In 1968, after saying he wouldn’t seek the election (and upsetting his main supporter Agnew), Nelson finally decides to run, bypassing the primaries for a direct run at the convention. He failed.

With all his money and charm, maybe there was another way. Nelson and his family had been involved with psyops for years.

From George Michael Evica’s, A Certain Arrogance:

Powerful forces had indeed come together to enlist [John Foster] Dulles as a major player in the expected dark times. In 1938, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., had offered him the direction of a “task force” that would evaluate “missionary activities throughout the world.” Given the historical connections between the Rockefeller family's goals in investment, politics, intelligence, and evangelistic religion, the offer to John Foster Dulles was anticipatory.

The Rockefeller clan and its missionary intelligence network had emulated other powerful families, including the historic Medici. For over a thousand years the Papacy, and later the Spanish Inquisition, used the Church's missionaries in Europe and the New World for intelligence collection. Their modern counterpart was the Rockefeller family, operating in the American West and, later, in Central and South America.

As early as 1883, the Rockefellers had “used missionaries to gather intelligence about [Native American] insurgencies in the West or to discourage them.” The growth of the Rockefellers' wealth was exactly matched by the family's collaboration with Christian Fundamentalist missionary action.

By 1957, the Rockefellers had decided to support the Fundamentalist revivalism of Billy Graham, whose supporters included the ostensibly liberal Protestant Henry Pitriey Van Dusen, a Rockefeller Foundation trustee and editor of Foster Dulles' “spiritual legacy.” The Establishment Protestant churches supported Graham, hoping to enlist converts, but the Rockefellers' allies in Fundamentalism ultimately triumphed.

Though Dulles was unable to join the Rockefeller missionary commission as its director, he did complete a part of his task, visiting Chinese General Chiang Kai-shek. Dulles assessed the Asian leader as a stalwart anti-Communist and “sincere Chinese patriot,” who was the target of unfair Communist propaganda concerning the general's anti-democratic propensities. For Foster, the visit was the beginning of his long involvement in Sino-American politics. Dulles' appraisal of Chiang Kai-shek was an important illustration of the Rockefeller family's fusion of profit-seeking and Christian missionary work, Dulles maintained his relationship with Rockefeller interests throughout the rest of his life, eventually serving as chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation.

In 1937, just before his trip to China, Dulles accepted two invitations to a pair of major international gatherings later cited as catalysts for his religious “rediscovery.” John Foster was invited to attend the “Conference on Intellectual Co-operation in Paris, under League of Nations auspices … called to study the possibilities for peaceful change in a world … moving inexorably toward war.” Dulles' negative response to this political meeting was suspicious, dovetailing too neatly with his imminent return to Godliness. The ensuing Conference on Church and State meeting in Oxford, England, had invited world-prominent clergy and secular leaders. According to one of his biographers, Dulles was most impressed “by the scope and range of the ideas the churchmen had to offer.” But it was more likely that Dulles and his backers decided to revive Foster's dormant relation to the Divinity as a perfect tool of foreign policy and intelligence. His brother Allen's earlier success during World War I using the same tactic may, in fact, have been Foster's model. Acutely aware of the economic and political importance of the world conflict that was to erupt, Dulles recognized the “moral dynamism potential” of the liberal Protestant tradition.

Foster Dulles' Epiphany: Spiritual or Political?

Dulles then supposedly experienced a religious revelation in July 1937. Yet “some [commentators] thought … the more than casual effort to demonstrate a revival of his faith reflected an attempt to give himself a more appropriate 'image' for church work.”

With Dulles' longtime commitment to German and Japanese economic and industrial development, his “reasons for moving deeply into church work at this time may have been complex.” His “church work” after 1937 was, in fact, troubling to a number of observers.

Why? Both the secular Paris conference and the religious Oxford conference in 1937 had been organized by the same international elite establishment, and undoubtedly for the same purpose: to support an alliance of Western “Christian” power in opposition to the anticipated strength of the Communist East, led by the Soviet Union. Dulles' son Avery summarized his father's intention succinctly: “He began to be interested in using the churches [beginning in 1937] as a means … to overcome … nationalism and promote world peace.” Not to mention, of course, nurturing a supranational capitalist world order engaged in a battle to the death against Stalin's USSR and labor organizations of any kind, anywhere. [emphasis added]

In January 1954, Jackson left his government psyops machinery in place and returned to the Luce media empire. Several close friends in covert operations and psychological warfare followed C.D. as presidential representatives, including Jackson’s immediate replacement, Nelson Rockefeller. Regardless of who held the position as White House psyops chief, C.D. Jackson had his hand on the throttle of American psychological warfare from 1954 through 1959, so frequently shuttling between his positions with Luce and Eisenhower’s administration that Jackson’s staff at Time created a party game out of his “send-offs and welcomes.” [emphasis added]

Later in 1954, Jackson wrote in support of Robert A. McClure, commander of the American Military Mission in Iran after the CIA coup. Analysts for the Agency regularly sent their reports to both the CIA and C.D. Jackson. He was able to bring his psychological warfare perspective to the United Nations in 1954 as the American delegate to the UN’s Trusteeship Committee, but it was a troubling time as he tried to make political sense of the United States’ ambiguous attitude toward colonialism.…” Jackson felt “the Western World,” outnumbered by “the swirling mass of emotionally Supercharged Africans and Asians and Arabs,” would discover that this “much-needed world forum” would finally be witness to “putting white prestige on the skids.” Notably absent from Jackson’s concern for “white prestige” was any sense of either color-free justice or the truth. Jackson was a key member of the World Trade Foundation that “intensified the movement to globalize America’s international business interests.”

In 1953, C.D. Jackson became the acknowledged founder of the Bilderberg group in the United States, with President Eisenhower still an enthusiastic working partner of the new political and economic establishment. Jackson himself attended every Bilderberg meeting until he died in 1964. With the American branch of the Bilderberg Conference established, Jackson moved to develop an “economic expansion” project fusing potent symbols with powerful trade and commerce plans: images and actions were to be combined to “counter the lure of communism.”

That project was established at the Princeton Conference for a World Economic Plan, held on May 15 and 16, 1954. Jackson shared his global vision with Allen Dulles. Jackson’s careful selection of images and words, embodied in the Princeton Conference recommendations, “became the basis for … a new world economic policy for the United States. Both the language and the actions of the trans-national corporations were created by the master of American psyops. Despite C.D. Jackson’s “crisis-mongering,” President Eisenhower realized how important propaganda was to the success of his “Foreign Economic Policy Battle plan.” The Advertising Council of America was enlisted, a ”private” Committee on Foreign Trade, Inc., was established, and through that front group Time, Inc., again commanded by Henry Luce and C.D. Jackson, “contributed expansively to [Eisenhower’s] … success.” By 1956, Eisenhower had captured significant support with his vigorous and creative word choice; Paul Hoffman praised the president, noting that ‘Semantics are important.…’’ C.D. Jackson must have beamed. If a Third World War were to happen, President Eisenhower had reportedly confided to C.D. Jackson that it would be won by American psychological operations.

Jackson continued to be called on by the president to brainstorm new intelligence ideas and operations. But those operations were frequently corrupt, and as a key agent of the US Power-elite C.D. Jackson was deeply involved in manipulating American social, educational, and cultural institutions. Just before Eisenhower called on him again to serve as the president’s Cold War/psyops expert, Jackson attended a crucial academic meeting whose agenda was damage control from seven years of CIA collaboration.

Initiated in 1950, Project Troy, surely named for the famous Trojan Horse subterfuge, had collected a group of top-drawer Harvard faculty. The project ultimately morphed into the Center for International Studies (CENIS), responsible for key analyses of the Soviet Union, China, and nuclear weapons. Because Harvard banned on-campus classified research, Troy/CENIS had to meet at MIT.

The original Cambridge group had been given a typical C.D. Jackson psy-ops directive to solve a “specific [apparently technical] problem”: How could the CIA overcome Soviet jamming of the CIA’S propaganda broadcasts to Eastern Europe? “Within one year, the Agency spent $300,000 so that CENIS could “research worldwide political, economic and social change … in the interest of the entire intelligence community.” Seven years after Troy/CENIS tackled its initial problem, a CENIS review board met to examine the difficult question of “academic integrity.”

Despite the fundamental reality that the Cambridge faculty had been bought by the CIA, the reviewers worried over “corrosion” of the academic “channel,” as if individual faculty members were somehow like mental tributaries through which classified analysis flowed into the main Agency pipeline. McGeorge Bundy, an intimate friend of the CIA who chaired the CENIS review, immediately saw the value of the metaphor. As he put it, “The channel is more important than that a lot of water should be running through it.” There could be no doubt as to whose imagery had captured the flawed ethic of the Cambridge operation. Attendee C. D. Jackson observed that American intelligence “work has got to be done.…” And, he added, “I have not noticed any visible corrosion.’’ So much for the integrity of Harvard Yard’s academic plumbing.

The program continued, and the initial intrusion of the CIA was almost immediately matched by the corruption of Harvard’s Center for International Affairs, through at least 1957. In the summer of 1955, Nelson Rockefeller called a conference on “the psychological aspects of U.S. strategy” with key psyops stars from the Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, including its School of Advanced International studies; the U.S. Military Academy; the director of CENIS, housed at M.I.T.; the director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ “studies”; American air intelligence; the New England Electric System; and others, including Henry Kissinger, at the time hanging his hat at Harvard. The top U.S. psychological warfare veteran in attendance was, of course, C.D. Jackson.

Whatever moral rant John Foster Dulles was directing at that moment against Russia and China, Jackson and associates were running the American psyops show. On May 7, 1956, Jackson again met a powerhouse of “psych-war” people, including DeWitt C. Poole, A.A. Berle, Tom Braden, and Nelson Rockefeller, who were attempting to re-energize the OCB as Eisenhower was applying a brake to the government’s psychological warfare engine. Whenever possible, psyops agents had been active outside the White House and the State Department.

Through 1955-56, Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, the CIA, C.D. Jackson and his Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty had cooperatively stirred the bubbling European pot of anti-Soviet revolution, hoping for American establishment and intelligence support. But President Eisenhower distanced himself from the more ferocious of the Cold War/psyops crusaders; the worst of a dangerous Cold War period was coming to a close, and C.D. Jackson apparently lost some power and influence. Yet Jackson still remained a key figure in the administration’s “rollback programs, commanding the Operations Coordinating Board. [emphasis added]

Some history and to help understand the nomenclature from Wiki:

Approval of clandestine and covert operations

The Directorate of Plans (DDP) was created in 1952, taking control of the Office of Policy Coordination, a covert action group that received services from the CIA but did not go through the CIA management. The other main unit that went into the Directorate of Plans was the Office of Special Operations, which did clandestine intelligence collection (e.g., espionage) as opposed to covert action.

Approval of clandestine and covert operations came from a variety of committees, although in the early days of quasi-autonomous offices and the early DDP, there was more internal authority to approve operations. After its creation in the Truman Administration, the CIA was, at first, the financial manager for OPC and OSO, authorized to handle "unvouchered funds" by National Security Council document 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function.

Early autonomy of OPC

At first, the supervision by committee allowed the OPC to exercise "early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them".

NSC 10/2 defined the scope of these operations as: "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations."

Guerrilla warfare was outside this statement of scope, but such operations came under partial CIA control with NSC 10/5 of October 1951. See "Psychological Strategy Board" below. To implement covert actions under NSC 10/2, OPC was created on September 1, 1948. Its initial structure had it taking "guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to OPC through the DCI. During the Korean War the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of CIA's activities.

"Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy."

Putting special operations under a "psychological" organization paralleled the military's development of United States Army Special Forces, which was created by a Pentagon unit called the Psychological Warfare Division. "NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare"[15] The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

Increasing control by CIA management

Main article: Oversight of United States covert operations

After Smith, who was Eisenhower's World War II Chief of Staff, consolidated of OSO, OPC, and CIA in 1952, the Eisenhower administration began narrowing CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad". A series of committees, containing representatives from State, Defense, CIA, and sometimes the White House or NSC, reviewed operations. Over time and reorganizations, these committees were called the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), NSC 5412/2 Special Group or simply Special Group, Special Group (Augmented), 303 Committee, and Special Group (Counterinsurgency).


Forces were operating within and without the governmental “operations.” The Dulles brothers operated their own “CIA” inside the State Department, in association with Frank Wisner’s OPC (Office of Policy Coordination), and had brought into the U.S. thousands of Nazi’s against direct written orders of then President Harry Truman. This was extra-constitutional support of a big psyops, the Cold War, a struggle staged as the manipulative morality play of absolute good versus absolute evil. “Winning the hearts, minds and pocketbooks.”

As time went on the extra-constitutional activity increased: a continual attack upon the authority of the Office of the President of the United States. Considering that Nixon got his big break through his knowledge of the Dulles’ behind their back Nazi importation, Watergate must have been sweet revenge.

As we all know, if two rather interesting ladies, FBI informer Sarah Jane Moore or Manson-follower Lynnette “Squeaky” Fromme had worked their guns better. Gerry would have been dead and Rocky would have reached his “goal.” Because of the wording of the 22nd Amendment, Rocky could then go to the American people, plead on all the trouble, and then “heal the nation” for a possible two more terms … enough time to get empire in place.

Now for an interesting view of history, out of the shadows of black ops one can discern the hum of psyops: surveillance, blackmail, assassination and narcotics trafficking.

From Rodney Stich’s Defrauding America:


Parker described his role in a highly secret intelligence unit called Pegasus. Russbacher confirmed this group's existence, although he was hesitant to talk about it. Parker stated that Pegasus was set up by former President Harry Truman to spy on other CIA units and report to the President any unlawful activities by the CIA. He said the last president the Pegasus unit was able to report to was John F. Kennedy.



He stated that after President Kennedy decided to pull U.S. troops out of the CIA Vietnam operation, that would cause the loss of billions of dollars from the CIA drug trafficking, certain CIA factions decided to assassinate Kennedy. Pegasus people discovered the plot and told Kennedy two weeks before he was assassinated.

These statements by a deep-cover CIA operative and Marine Corps officer certainly raises serious questions and adds further fuel to the speculation and charges that the CIA was involved in Kennedy's assassination. In light of other CIA criminalities, there should be little doubt that the CIA has the mindset to assassinate a president of the United States. In later pages there is additional support for this theory.

Parker stated that after Kennedy's death the Pegasus unit was not able to function as intended, because of the corrupt activities of U. S. presidents after the Kennedy assassination. He named Johnson, Nixon and Bush. He stated that Reagan was not implicated like the others; he was more of a figurehead for powerful factions controlled by former CIA Director Bush.


The role of deep-cover CIA officer, Colonel Trenton Parker, has been described in earlier pages, and his function in the CIA's counter-intelligence unit, Pegasus. Parker had stated to me earlier that a CIA faction was responsible for the murder of JFK, and that Kennedy was advised three weeks before the assassination of a plan to assassinate him in one of three cities that Kennedy would be visiting.

During an August 21, 1993 conversation, in response to my questions, Parker stated that his Pegasus group had tape recordings of plans to assassinate Kennedy. I asked him "what group were these tapes identifying?" Parker replied: "Rockefeller, Allen Dulles, Johnson of Texas, George Bush, and J. Edgar Hoover." I asked, "What was the nature of the conversations on these tapes?" [emphasis added]

I don't have the tapes now, because all the tape recordings were turned over to [Congressman] Larry McDonald. But I listened to the tape recordings and there were conversations between Rockefeller, [J. Edgar} Hoover, where Rockefeller asks, “Are we going to have any problems?” And he said, “No, we aren't going to have any problems. I checked with Dulles. Lf they do their job we'll do our job.” There are a whole bunch of tapes, because Hoover didn't realize that his phone has been tapped.

Parker had earlier stated to me that he turned over a full box of files and tapes, documentation, and micro-fiche, for the Pegasus Caribbean operation, to Congressman McDonald, shortly before the Congressman boarded the ill-fated Korean Airlines Flight 007 that was shot down by the Russians.

The November 1993 issue of Penthouse magazine had an in-depth article on Parker, in which federal agents sought to frame Parker and charge him with money-laundering. Parker had recognized one of the agents, and converted the Justice Department's scheme into a reverse-sting operation against them, using the techniques taught to him by the CIA. The government agents lost tens of thousands of dollars, not knowing that they had been recognized by Parker and were being taken.

Justice Department prosecutors were unaware of what had occurred, and charged Parker with money laundering. These federal charges were later dropped (in mid-1993) when Parker produced evidence that he was a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the CIA.

One last little tidbit, from an online article by Jim Hougan, about the Yeoman Charles Radford and Admiral Thomas Moorer spy affair that was happening during Nixon’s presidency:

According to Radford, whom I interviewed many years ago, his “superiors” believed that Kissinger’s foreign policy was “catastrophic” by design. His own espionage activities, Radford insisted, were intended to defeat a conspiracy conceived by “the Rockefeller family” and orchestrated by the Council on Foreign Relations. The purpose of this supposed conspiracy, according to Radford, was to win the Soviets’ cooperation in guaranteeing the Rockefellers’ “continued domination” over the world’s currencies. In return for this, Nixon and Kissinger were to construct a foreign policy that would ensure Soviet hegemony and a one-world government.


Written by watergateexposed   

Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XIII

By Kris Millegan

The Dynamics of Sophistication – Part Four

Many of the scandals that have occurred in the United States since 1963 have been fundamentally interrelated; that is, the same people and institutions have been involved in a number of scandals (e.g., the Kennedy assassination and Watergate).

– David R. Simon, Elite Deviance (Fifth Edition)


The Asphalt Jungle was made in the middle of the “code” era, when the rules were strictly enforced:

“All criminal action had to be punished, and neither the crime nor the criminal could elicit sympathy from the audience. Authority figures had to be treated with respect, and the clergy could not be portrayed as comic characters or villains. Under some circumstances, politicians, police officers and judges could be villains, as long as it was clear they were the exception to the rule.”

You could show a crooked lawyer, but he must in the end reap his just desserts – the obligatory death by suicide. The aberration of corruption stopped with the flawed character, who with their noble last gesture, blotted out the stain on the family name. Cut, print, distribute and everyone goes home happy … and deluded.

Crooked lawyers, if they are good enough, die in their beds after a successful career in law, politics and finance. They advance their clients’ agendas, using devious and dubious measures. They like information. The ability to know and make secrets. It is amazing what can be hid behind the shield of “intelligence activity,” and/or “psychological warfare.”

Watergate and much of our contemporary “history” is replete with hoodwink, psy-ops, psychological warfare.

An excerpt from Christopher Simpson ‘s Science of Coercion:

What, then, is " psychological warfare"? According to William Daugherty , the term first appeared in English in a 1941 text on the Nazis' use of propaganda, fifth column activities, and terror in the early stages of the European war. U.S . military and intelligence organizations stretched the definition during World War II to cover a broader range of applications of psychology and social psychology to wartime problems, including battlefront propaganda, ideological training of friendly forces, and ensuring morale and discipline on the home front.

Since World War II, U.S. military and NATO manuals have typically defined " psychological warfare" or "psychological operations" as tactics as varied as propaganda, covert operations, guerrilla warfare, and, more recently, public diplomacy. Communist theoreticians have often referred to somewhat similar activities as "agitation and propaganda" and regarded them as a component of the related, yet broader concepts known as class struggle and peoples ' war. British and Nazi German strategies and tactics in the field have historically been termed "political warfare, and Weltanschauungskrieg ("worldview warfare"), respectively. Each of these conceptualizations of psychological warfare explicitly links mass communication with selective application of violence (murder, sabotage, assassination, insurrection, counter-insurrection , etc.) as a means of achieving ideological, political, or military goals. These overlapping conceptual systems often contributed to one another's development, while retaining characteristics of the political and cultural assumptions of the social system that generated it.

Within the present context, psychological warfare can best be understood as a group of strategies and tactics designed to achieve the ideological, political, or military objectives of the sponsoring organization (typically a government or political movement) through exploitation of a target audience's cultural-psychological attributes and its communication system. Put another way, psychological warfare is the application of mass communication to modem social conflict: it focus on the combined use of violence and more conventional forms of communication to achieve politico-military goals. [emphasis added]

A more complete illustration of the U.S. government's view of psychological warfare can be found in the definition used by the U.S. Army in war planning during the early cold war years. The army's definition was classified as top secret at the time it was promulgated (early 1948) and remained officially secret until the late 1980s, when I obtained a collection of early psychological warfare planning records through a Freedom of Information Act request. One of these documents reads:

Psychological warfare employs all moral and physical means, other than orthodox military operations, which tend to:

a. destroy the will and the ability of the enemy to fight.

b. deprive him of the support of his allies and neutrals.

c. increase in our own troops and allies the will to victory.

Psychological warfare employs any weapon to influence the mind of the enemy. The weapons are psychological only-in the effect they produce and not because of the nature of the weapons themselves. In this light, overt (white), covert (black), and gray propaganda; subversion; sabotage; special operations; guerrilla warfare; espionage; political, cultural, economic, and racial pressures are all effective weapons. They are effective because they produce dissension, distrust, fear and hopelessness in the minds of the enemy, not because they originate in the psyche of propaganda or psychological warfare agencies.

The phrase "special operations," as used here, is defined in a second document as:

those activities against the enemy which are conducted by allied or friendly forces behind enemy lines .... [They] include psychological warfare (black), clandestine warfare, subversion, sabotage, and miscellaneous operations such as assassination, target capture and rescue of downed airmen.

The army study goes on to summarize several of the tactics of persuasion just outlined, the three most basic of which are known as "white," "black," and" gray" propaganda. "White propaganda," the army states, "stress[es] simplicity, clarity and repetition." It is designed to be perceived by its audience as truthful, balanced, and factual, and the United States publicly acknowledged its promotion of this type of information through outlets such as the Voice of America. "Black" propaganda, in contrast, "stresses trouble, confusion, … and terror'. A variation of black propaganda tactics involves forging enemy documents and distributing them to target audiences as a means of discrediting rival powers. The U. S. government officially denies that it employs black propaganda, but in fact it has long been an integral aspect of U.S. foreign and domestic policy . "Gray" propaganda, as its name suggests, exists somewhere between " white" and " black" and typically involves planting false information about rivals in news outlets that claim to be independent of the U. S. government.

Other U.S. Army and National Security Council documents from the same period stress three additional attributes of the U.S. psychological warfare strategy of the day: the use of "plausible deniability" to permit the government to deny responsibility for "black" operations that were in truth originated by the United States; a conscious policy of polarizing neutral nations into either "pro-" or "anti-U .S. " camps; and the clandestine targeting of the U. S. population, in addition to that of foreign countries , for psychological operations.

Throughout this book, psychological warfare and psychological operations encompass this range of activities, as specified by the Army and the National Security Council. Several points should be underlined. First, psychological warfare in the U.S. conception has consistently made use of a wide range of violence, including guerrilla warfare, assassination, sabotage, and, more fundamentally, the maintenance of manifestly brutal regimes in client states abroad . Second, it also has involved a variety of propaganda or media work, ranging from overt (white) newscasting to covert (black) propaganda. Third, the targets of U.S. psychological warfare were not only the "enemy," but also the people of the United States and its allies. [emphasis added]

The “Watergating” of President Nixon was accomplished through psychological warfare, a controlled scandal orchestrated by past participants in other psy-ops. Watergate a was a gathering of knives for both Nixon and the Office of the President of the United States. Neither would ever be quite the same again.

We learned before that Allen Dulles recommended Ed Lansdale for the make-war machine in Vietnam, here we learn who were overseeing Lansdale in the Phillipines. From Science of Coercion:

… Philippines project of the early 1950s also demonstrated the ease with which ostensibly pluralistic, democratic conceptions of communication behavior and communication studies could be put to use in U. S. -sponsored counterinsurgency campaigns and in the management of authoritarian client regimes. Paul Linebarger, a leading U.S . psychological warfare expert specializing in Southeast Asia, bragged that the CIA had "invented" the Philippines' president Raymon Magsaysay and installed him in office. Once there, "the CIA wrote [Magsaysay's] speeches, carefully guided his foreign policy and used its press assets (paid editors and journalists) to provide him with a constant claque of support," according to historian and CIA critic William Blum.

The CIA's idea at the time was to transform the Philippines into a "showplace of democracy" in Asia, recalled CIA operative Joseph B. Smith, who was active in the campaign. In reality, though, Magsaysay's U.S.-financed counterinsurgency war against the Huk guerrillas became a bloody proving ground for a series of psychological warfare techniques developed by the CIA's Edward Landsdale, not least of which was the exploitation of the USIA's intelligence on Filipino culture and native superstitions. Tactics (and rhetoric) such as "search-and destroy" and "pacification" that were later to become familiar during the failed U.S. invasion of Vietnam were first elaborated under Landsdale's tutelage in the Philippines.

The relationship between the USIA and the CIA in the Philippines can be best understood as a division of labor. The two groups are separate agencies, and the USIA insists that it does not provide cover to the CIA's officers abroad. 56 But intelligence gathered by the USIA, such as that obtained through Bigman's surveys of Filipino "opinion leaders," is regularly provided to the CIA, according to a report by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 57 USIA and CIA work was first coordinated through "country plans" monitored by area specialists at President Truman's secretive Psychological Strategy Board (established in 1951) and, later, at the National Security Council under President Eisenhower. 58 By the time the Philippines project was in high gear during the mid-1950s, Eisenhower had placed policy oversight of combined CIA-USIA-U .S. military country plans in the hands of senior aides with direct presidential access – C. D. Jackson and later Nelson Rockefeller – who personally monitored developments and formulated strategy. [emphasis added] 

At the time, the implicit claim of BSSR's work for the government was that application of "scientific" psychological warfare and counterinsurgency techniques in the Philippines would lead to more democracy and less violence overall than had, say, the crude massacres of 1898-1902, when a U.S. expeditionary force suppressed an earlier rebellion by Philippine nationalist leader Emilio Aguinaldo. But looking back today, there is little evidence that such claims ever were true. More than forty years has passed since BSSR and the USIA's work in the Philippines began. The Huks were defeated; a relatively stable, pro-Western government was established in the country; and a handful of Filipinos have prospered. Yet by almost every indicator – infant mortality, life expectancy, nutrition, land ownership, education, venereal disease rates, even the right to publish or to vote – life for the substantial majority of Filipinos has remained static or gotten worse over those four decades.

BSSR's academics did not set U.S. policy in the Philippines, of course. But they did provide U.S . military and intelligence agencies with detailed knowledge of the social structure, psychology, and mood of the Philippines population, upon which modem anti-guerrilla tactics depend . Despite its claims, U.S . psychological warfare campaigns in the Philippines and throughout the developing world have generally increased the prevailing levels of violence and misery, not reduced them.


RockGeneralBrownsto be continued:
Written by Kris Millegan   

Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XII

By Kris Millegan    

The Dynamics of Sophistication – Part Three

At no time will the CIA be provided with more equipment, etc., than is absolutely necessary for the support of the operation directed and such support provided will always be limited to the requirements of that single operation.
                                                                                                                       — President Dwight Eisenhower, NSC 10/2

Ike, JFK, Earl Warren, LBJ and Nixon at JFK’s Inaugural

How do “interested parties” turn a republic into empire? It takes time, a few twists and turns behind the scenes (psy-ops), and “grease.”  The grease is blackmail.

How does one gather the material for blackmail? You can be at the “wrong” place at the right time, and discover a “terrible” secret. Or by gathering information surreptitiously, or by using “secure” reservoirs of private information held either by commerce or government.

Watergate, was one of the psy-ops on the road to empire. A very convenient stop, much was accomplished. And “they” got rid of Nixon, while weakening the Office of the President of the United States.

The excerpt  below shows how “they” got rid of a foreign president, from Fletcher Prouty’s  JFK, The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy:

… on an inside page of the New York Times on July 25, 1985, a tiny two-inch article, datelined Zaragoza, Spain, describing one of these Cold War battles, being fought with these secret tactics.

ZARAGOZA, Spain, July 24 (UPI)- Two army officers who herded villagers into a public square for mock executions were sentenced today to prison terms of four and five months, military authorities said.

A military tribunal ruled Tuesday that officers, Capt. Carlos Aleman and Lieut. Jaime Iniguez, had been overzealous in carrying out orders. 'They were ordered to stage a mock invasion of a town and to make it as realistic as possible, but they went too far," said a Defense Ministry spokesman, Lieut. Jesus del Monte.

This bizarre incident occurred in Spain. Similar events, using the same tactics, take place somewhere in the world almost daily, despite the apparent demise of the Cold War. They have one unique characteristic, seldom if ever seen in regular warfare, that sets them apart. Incidents such as this one, reported by the Times, serve to incite warfare rather than to bring it to an end. To give the age-old concept new meaning, “They make war… out of practically nothing."

The methods used in Spain are almost precisely those used by the CIA in, among other cases, the Philippines in the early 1950S and Indochina from 1945 to 1965. These will be discussed in later chapters. It is important to note that tens of thousands of foreign "paramilitary" and Special Forces troops have been trained at various U.S. military bases under CIA supervision and sponsorship. Some of this training is highly specialized, using advanced weapons and war-related material. Some of it takes place at American universities and even in manufacturing plants, where advanced equipment for this type of warfare is being made.

The Spanish application of this tactic of the secret war is interesting and threatens us all. In this case, the two army officers had been ordered to attack a town, with regular Spanish troops (albeit some of them disguised as natives), and to make it look and feel realistic. As undercover warriors, they were trained to do this. (No doubt, some were trained in the United States, where many of the weapons, activities, and techniques mentioned below are used in training.) Under other conditions at other times, these same t rained men might have been told to hijack a civilian aircraft; they might have been told to set up a mock car-bombing; they might have been told to run a mock hostage operation. There is no difference. The only military objective of these battles, and of this type of global conflict, is to create the appearance of war itself.

Now, the Spanish, for reasons of their own, had decided to teach this town a lesson. To initiate this campaign, a psychological-warfare propaganda team arrived in town. They put up posters, made inflammatory speeches in the village square, and showed propaganda films on the walls of buildings at night to stir up the village, warning of the existence and approach of a band of "terrorist-trained insurgents." That night, as the movies were being shown before the assembled villagers, a firefight kit, prearranged to explode in sequence to resemble a true skirmish, was detonated on a nearby hillside. Flares and rockets filled the sky. A helicopter gunship or two joined the mock battle scenario. By the time this Special Forces PsyWar team left that town, the whole region had been alarmed by the presence of these "insurgents, " The stage was set for the "mock invasion of the town," as ordered.

A few nights later, these two Spanish army officers (was the CIA involved?) divided their regular force into two groups: (a) the pseudo-insurgents and (b) the loyal regular forces. The "insurgents" took off their uniforms and donned native garb, the uniform of the "Peoples' Insurgents." Then they faded into the darkness and began to attack the town. First there was sporadic gunfire. Then some buildings went up in flames. Several big explosions occurred, and a bridge was blown up. The "insurgents" attacked the town as the villagers fled into the night. There was more gunfire, more burning and explosions. The "terrorists" looted the town and fired into the woods where the townspeople were hiding.

As the sun rose, an army unit in a convoy of trucks raced toward the town, entering it with guns ablaze. Above, a helicopter gunship added to the firepower. The "terrorists" were gunned down, left and right (all staged with blank ammunition). The others were rounded up and thrown into extra trucks under heavy guard. In short order, the victorious regular army captain had liberated the town. A loudspeaker in the helicopter called the villagers to return. All was safe! Fires were extinguished. Things returned to near normal.

Meanwhile, the captain remained with his interrogators, questioning the prisoners. Two "insurgent" leaders were discovered with false "terrorist" papers in their pockets and led back to the village square in chains. Charges were read against them, and the villagers observed them backed against the wall and shot! No sooner had the bodies hit the ground than they were picked up and tossed into the nearest truck. Justice had been done.

All trucks moved down the road. The battle was over. Before leaving, the captain turned to the town’s mayor and warned him against further terrorism. The townspeople cheered the heroic captain as he left the town in command of the convoy. The forces of justice had been victorious. They drove on a few more miles, and the whole gang – loyal army and "terrorists" – had breakfast together. The "dead" men joined the feast.

This was the "mock battle." Although I have added technical details to the Spanish scenario, I have been to such training programs at US military bases where identical tactics are taught to Americans as well as foreigners. It is all the same. As we shall see later, these are the same tactics that were exploited by CIA superagent Edward G. Lansdale and his men in the Philippines and Indochina.

This is an example of the intelligence service's "Fun and Games." Actually, it is as old as history; but lately it has been refined, out of necessity, into a major tool of clandestine warfare. Lest anyone think that this is an isolated case, be assured that it was not. Such "mock battles" and "mock attacks on native villages" were staged countless times in Indochina for the benefit of, or the orientation of, visiting dignitaries, such as John McCone when he first visited Vietnam as the Kennedy-appointed director of central intelligence. Such distinguished visitors usually observed the action from a helicopter, at "a safe distance." A new secretary of defense, such as Robert McNamara, who had never seen combat, especially combat in Southeast Asia, would be given the treatment. It was evident to other, more experienced observers that the tracks through the fields had been made by the 'Vietcong" during many rehearsals of the "attack." The war makers of Vietnam vintage left nothing to chance.

During the 1952-54 time period, when I flew in to the Philippines, I spent many hours talking with Ed Lansdale, his many Filipino friends, such as Juan C. "Johnny" Orendain, Col. Napoleon D. Valeriano, and members of his CIA "anti-Quirino" team and heard them tell these same stories. They all worked with Ramon Magsaysay in those days and related how he would divide his Special Forces into the "Communist HUKs" and the loyal military and then attack villages in the manner described above. Before long Ramon Magsaysay had been "elected" president of the Philippines, and President Quirino was on his way out. Later, when I worked in the same office with Lansdale in the Pentagon, he would relate how he and his Saigon Military Mission teammates applied similar tactics in Indochina, both North and South.

Not long after the CIA had been created, limited by law "to coordinate intelligence," the National Security Council authorized the super-secret Office of Policy Coordination, under the wartime OSS station chief in Romania, Frank Wisner, to carry out certain covert operations of a similar nature. This is the organization Ed Lansdale was assigned to in November 1949. There he worked under an experienced Far East hand, Col. Richard G. Stilwell, in the Far East /Plans division. The clandestine warfare in Greece and Bulgaria, which occurred at about the same time, is another example of OPC's undercover work. [emphasis added]

During the late forties, the CIA organized itself and grew. In these same years the OPC grew faster, and when Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's chief of staff during WWII, returned from Moscow, where he had been the US ambassador, to become the director of central intelligence, one of his first official acts was to have the OPC removed from the secretary of state and the secretary of defense and to have it placed directly under his control in the CIA. Although there was no lawful basis for this momentous move, it was done without formal protest. Everyone involved knew that the real reason for the creation of the CIA was to be the lead brigade of US. forces during the Cold War period.

Then, with the election of President Eisenhower in 1952, Allen W. Dulles was made the director of central intelligence, General Smith became the deputy secretary of state, and John Foster Dulles was made secretary of state. The high command for the Cold War was in place, and the stage was set for the CIAs dominant role in the invisible war. The Korean War, which had begun in 1950, had served to cover the CIAs rapid expansion into that field.

By 1952 it had been decided that the time had come to replace Quirino as president of the Philippines. Since he was, ostensibly, a good friend of the United States and avowedly an anti-Communist, it would require some delicate diplomacy to bring that about. The reasons for the forced removal of a national leader do not always follow ideological or political lines. It is more likely, as in the case of Quirino, that he had relaxed his business priorities with the United States in favor of other countries, thus reducing American exports to the Philippines. And that could be sufficient grounds for the removal of a leader in the big power game of the nation-states.

While the United States maintained the customary diplomatic relations with the Quirino government and had a strong ambassador in Manila, that ambassador had on his staff a strong CIA station chief, one George Aurell. This cloak of normalcy could not be changed. The ambassador urged Quirino to hold an election. Elections would be good for Quirino and would serve to quell the opposition, said to consist of a Communist-supported HUK rebellion. Other than that, Quirino saw no opposition and no problems with an election. An election was scheduled – for later.

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the ambassador and Aurell, the CIA slipped into the Philippines an undercover team headed by one of its superagents, Edward G. Lansdale. Although the true reason for his presence in Manila was not divulged to these senior Americans, this agent had access to certain anti-Quirino Filipinos. His ostensible role was to train selected Filipino army troops in PsyWar and other paramilitary tactics; his primary role, in fact, was to oust Quirino and to install Ramon Magsaysay in the office of president. The men selected for duty with Lansdale were put on regular training schedules with the US. Army and were trained outside of the Philippines. Then they were slipped back later into the Philippines and into their usual army units.

At the same time, all throughout the islands, the "HUK insurgency" was escalated by secret operations. News began to surface about the growing HUK insurgency. The HUKs were beginning to be found everywhere. There were reports of "HUK detachments" on all the islands. The rise of this notional "Communist" influence gave President Quirino what he thought was a strong platform. The Cold War "make war" tactic was well under way.

Then the CIA made its move. Lansdale had selected a handsome young Philippine congressman, Ramon Magsaysay, to play the role we have seen in the above scenario from Spain. He was to stage "mock attacks" and "mock liberations" on countless villages throughout the islands. Villages were attacked and destroyed by the "HUKs." Captain Magsaysay and his loyal band charged into town after town, killing and capturing the "HUKs" and liberating each village. This CIA agent had been equipped with the equivalent of a bookfull of blank checks that he used to finance the entire campaign. The CIA pumped out a flood of news releases, produced and projected propaganda movies, and held huge rallies – all to build up the reputation of the new "Robin Hood," Ramon Magsaysay. The plot was a success, and soon Magsaysay was made secretary of defense. Then, when the election campaign began, he ran for president against Quirino. Quirino was stunned by the entry of the "HUK Killer" hero into the campaign. But the president had one more ace up his sleeve: He had the traditional power to control the ballot boxes and to count the votes. An honest election was quite impossible in the Philippines.

The election was held. Magsaysay was certainly more popular than Quirino. Just prior to the election, the "HUKs" stirred themselves and rekindled Filipinos' memories of the gallant captain who had liberated their villages with a hot machine gun slung across his arm. The votes for Magsaysay poured in from all the islands. Then, from his office in the army, he sent out a command. He ordered his own loyal army troops to guard every voting site. Anny men sealed and loaded the ballot boxes into trucks and drove them to Manila, where all the votes were counted, in public. As they said on the streets, "Under those conditions a monkey could have won against Quirino." Quirino was outmaneuvered by this new tactic. Magsaysay won easily and became president of the Philippines.

In Manila, Quirino was not the only man stunned by these events. So was the American ambassador and, even more so, his CIA station chief, George Aurell. They fin ally realized that the CIA had kept them in the dark by concealing the true role of one of its most powerful undercover teams. The CIA had quietly pulled off the deal, right under their noses. Another battle in the Cold War had been won over "the forces of communism" – or so they were led to believe.

Magsaysay had become president as a result of the application, many times over, of the same scenario that those two officers in Spain had used in their mock attack. With Magsaysay president, the city was too small for the US. ambassador, CIA station chief, and CIA secret agent – the Magsaysay creator, with his Madison Avenue-type warfare and election campaign. Also, quite magically, it seemed that the HUKs had vanished. Cecil B. deMille could not have staged it any better.2

These are examples of the new intelligence methods that are actually "make war" tactics. The Spanish incident and the Magsaysay "election campaign" serve to illustrate how they work. The incidents recounted below will serve to broaden the reader's understanding of the CIA's worldwide operations. During the late forties, there was trouble in Greece, and the fledgling CIA got a foothold there and began to develop a major empire in that region. Greece became a base for overflight reconnaissance aircraft. Secret airfields were used in Greece and in Turkey; and from the time of the murder of Premier Muhammad Mossadegh of Iran, in 1953, the CIA was the most potent force behind the shaky throne of the Shah of Iran.

…, more than one-half of all the military materiel once stockpiled on Okinawa for the planned invasion of Japan had been reloaded in September 1945 and transshipped to Haiphong, the port of Hanoi, Vietnam's capital. This stockpile had amounted to what the army called a 145,000 "man-pack" of supplies, that is, enough of everything required during combat to arm and supply that many men for war.

Once in Haiphong Harbor, this enormous shipment of arms was transferred under the direction of Brig. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher, who was supporting the OSS, and his associate, Ho Chi Minh. They had come from China to mop up the remnants of the defeated Japanese army. Hos military commander Col. Vo Nguyen Giap, quickly moved this equipment into hiding for the day when it would be needed. By 1954, that time had come.

On January 29,1954, a meeting of the President's Special Committee on Indochina convened in the office of the deputy secretary of defense, Roger M. Kyes. The ostensible purpose was to discuss what could be done to aid the French, who had made some urgent requests for military assistance. A major item on the agenda of this meeting was the reading of the "Erskine Report" on Indochina. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Ret'd), was assistant to the secretary of defense, special operations, 1953-61, and under President Eisenhower was chainnan of the Working Group of the President's Special Committee on Indochina3 This important report "was premised on US action short of the contribution of US combat forces."

At the end of the meeting Allen Dulles, then the director of central intelligence, suggested that an unconventional-warfare officer, Col. Edward G. Lansdale,4 be added to the group of American liaison officers that Gen. Henri Navarre, the French commander, had agreed to accept in Indochina. The committee thought this arrangement would prove to be acceptable and authorized Dulles to put his man in the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Saigon. [emphasis added]

The start of a new phase of the a SS/CIA activity in Indochina, this step marked the beginning of the CIA's intervention into the affairs of the government of Indochina, which at that time was French. It was not long before the reins of government were wrested from the French by the Vietminh, after their victory at Dien Bien Phu under the leadership of our friend of OSS days, Ho Chi Minh.

With this action, the CIA established the Saigon Military Mission (SMM) in Vietnam. It was not often in Saigon. It was not military. It was CIA. Its mission was to work with the anti-Vietminh Indochinese and not to work with the French. With this background and these stipulations, this new CIA unit was not going to win the war for the French. As we learned the hard way later, it was not going to win the war for South Vietnam, either, or for the United States. Was it supposed to?

This is the way the CIA's undercover armies work, as they have operated in countless countries since the end of WWII. They move unobtrusively with a small team, plenty of money, and a boundless supply of equipment as backup. They make contact with the indigenous group they intend to support, regardless of who runs the government. Then they increase the level of activity until a conflict ensues. Because the CIA is not equipped or sufficiently experienced to handle such an operation when combat intensifies to that level, the military generally is called upon for support. At that time the level of military support has risen to such an extent that this action can no longer be termed either covert or truly deniable. At that point, as in Vietnam, operational control is transferred to the military in the best way possible, and the hostilities continue until both sides weary of the cost in men, money, materiel, and noncombatant lives and property. There can be no clear victory in such warfare, as we have learned in Korea and Indochina. These "pseudowars" serve simply to keep the conflict going. As we have said above, that is the objective of these undercover tactics.

This concept of the necessity of conflict takes much from the philosopher Hegel (1770-1831). He believed that each nation emerges as a self-contained moral personality. Thus, might certifies right, and war is a legitimate expression of the dominant power of the moment. It is more than that. It is a force for the good of the state since it discourages internal dissent and corruption and fosters the spiritual cement of patriotism.

And in this excerpt we get to see how our republic used to work. Please notice the players. Again, from Fletcher Prouty’s  JFK, The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy:

In late 1960, when the departing President, Dwight Eisenhower, met with his successor, John F. Kennedy, he told him that the biggest trouble spot would be in Laos and that with Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon, he had little to worry about there. U.S. participation in Laos is another story, but one factor of the fighting in Laos did have a most significant impact upon the escalation of the war in South Vietnam: It began the evolution of an entirely new set of tactical characteristics of that warfare.

A full squadron of U.S. Marine Corps helicopters had been secretly transferred, at the request of the CIA, from Okinawa to Udorn, Thailand, just across the river from Laos. The helicopters that saw combat in Laos were based and maintained in Thailand by U.S. Marines. These military men did not leave Thailand; the helicopters were flown to the combat zones of Laos by CIA mercenary pilots of the CAT Airlines organization, under the operational control of the CIA.

In those days, in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Directive #5412, every effort had been made to keep U.S. military and other covert assistance at a level that could be "plausibly" disclaimed. The theory was that if these operations were compromised in any way, the U.S. government should be able to "disclaim plausibly" its role in the action. In other words, these helicopters had been "sterilized." There were no U.S. Marine Corps insignia on them, there were no marine serial numbers, no marine paperwork, no marine pilots. This was at best a thin veneer; but the veneer was needed to make it possible to use the marine equipment.

Back in Saigon, CIA operators wanted those helicopters transferred to Vietnam. Many of the CIA agents who had been infiltrated into South Vietnam, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Agreements, had been moved there secretly from Laos. While in Laos they had become accustomed to the use and convenience of this large force of combat helicopters. They wanted them in Vietnam, where they proposed to use them to transport South Vietnamese army troops to fight the fast-growing numbers of "enemy" who were rioting for food and water in the rice-growing areas of the Camau Peninsula. This helicopter movement was planned to be the CIAs first operational combat activity of the Vietnam War. It turned out to also be the first step of a decade of escalation of that war.

At that time, all American military aid to South Vietnam was strictly limited by the "one for one" replacement stipulation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The CIA could not move a squadron of military helicopters into South Vietnam, because there were no helicopters there to replace. So movement of those helicopters from Laos would have to be a covert operation. Any covert operation could be initiated and maintained only in accordance with a specific directive from the National Security Council and with the cooperation and direct assistance of the Department of Defense.

The CIA's first attempt to have these helicopters moved for combat purposes came in mid-1960 and was an attempt to beat the system. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, the deputy director of central intelligence, called one of his contacts (who happened to be this author) in the Office of Special Operations (OSO), a division of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to see if these helicopters could be moved to Vietnam quickly and quietly, on an emergency basis, because of the outbreak of rioting all over the country.

In those days, the Office of Special Operations followed the policy set forth by Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, which closely followed the language of the law, that is, the National Security Act of 1947. The pertinent language of that act states that the CIA operates "under the directions of the NSC."

At the time of General Cabell's call, OSO had received no authorization for such a move, and the request was denied on the ground that such a move would be covert and that the NSC had not directed such an operation into Vietnam. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the letter of this law was followed carefully.

In most cases, the CIA did not possess enough assets in facilities, people, and materiel to carry out the operations it wanted to perform. Therefore, the CIA had to come to the military establishment for support of its clandestine operations. The Defense Department would not provide this support without an agreed-upon NSC directive for each operation and usually without a guarantee of financial reimbursement from the CIA for at least "out-of-pocket" costs. This kept the CIA at bay and under reasonable control during these more "normal" years.

There is an interesting anecdote from this period that reveals President Eisenhower's personal concern with clandestine operations. Control of the CIA has never been easy. During the early part of Eisenhower's first term, the NSC approved a directive – NSC 10/2 – that governed the policy for the development and operation of clandestine activity. The NSC did not want covert operations to be the responsibility of the military. It said, quite properly, that the military's role was a wartime, not a peacetime, one. Therefore, such operations, when directed, would be assigned to the CIA. At the same time, it had long been realized that the CIA did not have adequate resources to carry out such operations by itself and that it was better that it didn't.

Thus, the NSC ruled that when such operations had been directed, the CIA would turn to the Defense Department, and when necessary, to other departments or agencies of the government, for support.

Sometimes the support provided was considerable. President Eisenhower was quite disturbed by this policy. He saw that it would create, within the organization of the CIA, a surrogate military organization designed to carryout military-type covert operations in peacetime. It would follow, he thought, that the CIA might, over the years, become a very large, uncontrollable military force in itself. He could not condone that, and he acted to curb such a trend.

President Eisenhower had written in the margin of the first page of the NSC 10/2 directive, on the copy that had been sent to the Defense Department: "At no time will the CIA be provided with more equipment, etc., than is absolutely necessary for the support of the operation directed and such support provided will always be limited to the requirements of that single operation."

This stipulation by the President worked rather well as long as the Office of the Secretary of Defense enforced it strictly. Later, certain elements of the military turned this directive around and began to use the CIA as a vehicle for doing things they wanted to do- as with the Special Forces of the U.S. Army, but could not do, because of policy, during peacetime.

This situation was confronted seriously by President Kennedy immediately following the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961.3

By the early 1950s, former President Harry S. Truman was saying that when he signed the CIA legislation into law, he made the biggest mistake of his presidency. In those same years, President Eisenhower had similar thoughts, and he did everything he could to place reasonable controls on the agency. Both of these men feared the CIA because of its power to operate in secrecy and without proper accountability.

During the Eisenhower administration, the Defense Department was usually scrupulous about this note penned on NSC 10/2 by the President and was careful to limit support to that needed for the current operation. The result was that there was always close cooperation and collaboration between the agency and the Defense Department on most clandestine operations. In other words, the clandestine operations carried out during that period were usually what might be called joint operations, with the CIA being given operational control. This applied to the development of all "military" activities in Vietnam, at least until the marines landed there in March 1965.

This NSC policy applied to that request for helicopters from General Cabell of the CIA and accounts for the fact that his original request was vetoed by the Defense Department. This veto required the CIA to prepare its case more formally and to go first to the NSC with its request for the helicopters. In those days, the NSC had a subcommittee, the "5412/2 Committee," or "Special Group," that handled covert activities. This group consisted of the deputy undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, and the director of central intelligence, the latter serving as the group's "action officer." In 1957, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also became a member. Approval for these helicopters was eventually obtained from this Special Group, and the secretary of defense authorized the Office of Special Operations to make all arrangements necessary with the Marine Corps to move the aircraft to Vietnam – secretly – from Udorn, Thailand, to an area south of Saigon near Camau.4

Perhaps more than any other single action of that period, this movement of a large combat-ready force in 1960 marked the beginning of the true military escalation of the war in Vietnam. From that time on, each new action under CIA operational control moved America one step closer to intervention with U.S. military units under U.S. military commanders.

By 1960-61, the CIA had become a surrogate U.S. military force, complete with the authority to develop and wage warfare during peacetime.5

In the process, the CIA was fleshed out with U.S. military personnel who had been "sheep-dipped"6 to make it appear that only civilians were involved. This process was to have a detrimental impact upon the implementation of the Vietnam War: It put CIA civilian officials in actual command of all operational forces in the fast-growing conflict, at least until 1965. As an additional factor, the concealment of military personnel in the CIA led to many of the problems that the armed forces would later delegate to the League of Families of Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia.

By the time this policy giving the CIA "operational" control over all American pseudomilitary units in Vietnam was changed, the "strategy" of warfare in Southeast Asia had become so stereotyped that such true military commanders as Generals Westmoreland and Abrams found little room to maneuver. They were required to take over a "no-win," impossible situation without a military objective, except that of the overriding Grand Strategy of the Cold War: that is, to make war wherever possible, to keep it going, to avoid the use of H-bombs, and to remember Malthus's and Darwin's lessons that the fittest will survive.

Therefore, when the NSC directed a move of helicopters to Vietnam, it ordered the Marine Corps unit at Udorn to be returned, with its own helicopters, to Okinawa. New helicopters of the same type were transported from the United States – meaning, of course, that new procurement orders of considerable value were placed with the helicopter-manufacturing industry, a business that was almost bankrupt at the time.

At the same time, the CIA had to put together a large civilian helicopter unit, much larger than the original Marine Corps unit, with maintenance and flight crews who were for the most part former military personnel who had left the service to take a job at higher pay and a guarantee of direct return to their parent service without loss of seniority. This meant that overseas, combat wage scales were paid to everyone in the unit, at a cost many times that of the military unit it replaced.

As soon as the helicopters arrived and were made ready for operational activities, the CIA's "army" began training with elite troops of the new South Vietnamese army. They were being hurried into service against those villages where the most serious "refugee-induced" rioting was under way. This operation opened an entirely new chapter of the thirty years of war in Vietnam.

Now who was the enemy? When CIA helicopters, loaded with heavily armed Vietnamese soldiers, were dispatched against "targets" in South Vietnam, who could they identify as "enemy"? It was during this period that we heard the oft-repeated reply "Anyone who runs away when we come must be the enemy."

… in December 1960, President-elect Kennedy made a surprising announcement. He had decided to keep Allen W. Dulles as his director of central intelligence and J. Edgar Hoover as head of the FBI. With this announcement, the stage was set for the 1960s – the decade in which hundreds of thousands of American fighting men would see action in the escalating war in Vietnam.

Written by Kris Millegan   
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