Thursday February 22, 2018
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Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XXIII

By Kris Millegan

Splitting HaresPart Three

And Judas Iscariot, one of the twelve, went unto the chief priests, to betray him unto them.
And when they heard it, they were glad, and promised to give him money.
And he sought how he might conveniently betray him.
                                                                                           –Mark 14:10-11



Confidential informants change history.


After World War One, Hitler had stayed in the army as one of their trusted political agents. In this capacity he was sent to report on one of a large range of political groups that sprang up in Munich in this period, to see whether it was dangerous or whether it could be enrolled in the cause of counter revolution. This was the German Worker's Party, founded on 5 January 1919. The fledgling party was in fact another creation of the hyperactive Thule Society.


Captain Ernst Roehm, a brillant soldier during WWI, was in 1918 a  prominent leader of the District Command: he served as liaison between the District Command and the German industrialists who were directly funding the District Command to help it fight communism. Captain Roehm and many other members of the District Command were members of a mystical organization known as the 'Thule Society' [Thulegesellschaft].

The Thule believed in the Aryan super race' and it preached the coming of a German 'Messiah' who  would lead Germany to glory and a new Aryan civilization. The Thule group was financed by some of the very same industrialists who supported the District Command. The Thule was also directly supported by the German High Command (GHC)."

He met Adolf Hitler in 1919 when Hitler was spying for the GHC and he helped to launch Hitler's political career. Roehm organized the storm troops  (Sturmabteilung or SA), the militia of the National Socialist (Nazi) party. The SA's role in the National Socialist movement provoked conflict between Roehm and Hitler, who wanted the SA to be an instrument of the Nazi party, rather than Roehm's private army. Roehm was imprisoned briefly for his participation in the abortive beer-hall putsch (1923). After his release conflict with Hitler flared again, and Roehm resigned (Apr., 1925) his party posts.

At the end of 1930, Hitler recalled him as SA commander. Within a year, Roehm had developed a large army and was Hitler's principal rival for party power.  After Hitler became chancellor (Jan., 1933), Roehm pressed unsuccessfully for SA control over the regular army. Late in 1933 he was made minister without portfolio. In June, 1934, he was coldly shot by SS men in Hitler's blood purge, supposedly because he had been planning an SA-led coup. He was 47.


1919 Adolph Hitler joins the Thule Society, which founds National Socialist Party to drum up support for another war. British fascists are tied closely to the Thule Group, the Golden Dawn, etc. Hitler is also trained as a police spy under Captain Mayr of the Bavarian Army Group Command IV. In September, Hitler enters the German Workers Party (DAP), a creation of the Thule Society. Hitler, still in the Army, is assigned espionage duties.

1919 Hitler’s military intelligence operation engaged in domestic terrorism. Rohm takes Hitler to see Dietrich Eckart, the morphine addict who heads the German Thule Society. 1920 In Germany, the DAP becomes the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi Party).

1920 Montague Norman achieves governorship of the Bank of England until 1944. It was Norman who decided that Hitler should get help from London's financial sector to build his influence against the Bolsheviks in Germany in 1934. 1920 Britain declares its opium war against the United States. Prohibition in the U.S. brings narcotics trafficking and large-scale organized crime into the U.S. 1920 Banking panic of 1920. Federal Reserve orders bank to recall loans. …1920 William Donovan meets Adolph Hitler at Berchtesgaden and Pension Moritz. 1920 Period begins where 400 political figures in Germany are assassinated.

1923 Nazis assassinate all political opposition. Ernst Rohm is killed and the German military is consolidated under Hitler. 1923 In Germany, massive inflation takes place as the Reichbank issues a total of 92.8 quintillion paper marks. One pound of butter = 6 trillion marks. 1923 U.S. President Harding dies mysteriously after reading a coded message. 1923 U.S. Congressman Stephen Porter passes a bill through Congress calling for import quotas on opium that would reduce consumption 90%, leaving the remaining 10% for “medical purposes.” 1924 William Donovan comes to Washington D.C. at the request of Harlan Stone, one of Donovan’s professors at Columbia, to become Asst. Attorney General of the U.S. Donovan requests Edgar Hoover’s removal from FBI, but Stone appoints him to head the agency.



to be continued…

Written by Kris Millegan   

Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XXII

By Kris Millegan

Splitting HaresPart Two

I know a funny little man, 
As quiet as a mouse,

Who does the mischief that is done 
In everybody's house!
There's no one ever sees his face,
 And yet we all agree
That every plate we break was cracked 
By Mr. Nobody.


Confidential informants many times, have no idea of whom they are truly working for. They may have one “handler” or several. The CI “job” is to gather raw intelligence to then be used by investigators and/or prosecutors to make a criminal case … or so the story goes.

As shown in the case studies presented in Vol. XXI, CIs are put into tenuous situations where lines soon blur and with the lack of oversight, many times troubling questions arise: Would the activity happened the same without the presence of the CI? Did the CI act as an agent provocateur? Did the CI go out of bounds? Does the CI have his own agenda?

How does law enforcement look at CIs?

From Confidential Informant: Law Enforcement's Most Valuable Tool:


"Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's disposition can only be obtained from other men." -Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Our story begins 2000 years ago with the words of Sun Tzu, a Chinese general and a man who valued information and those who brought it to him. The informant is an institution as old as history. Controversial for nearly as long, the informant's role in law enforcement is as important today as it was in Sun Tzu's day. One might suppose that, at a time when science has given the police more tools than ever before to use in the war on crime, we would not need to rely so much on the informant. Unfortunately. Sun Tzu was right in saying that knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other people.

Law enforcement's challenge is to make effective use of this valuable resource and to do so in an ethical way. This book is written primarily for criminal justice professionals to assist them in meeting this challenge. Although I believe it offers some relatively new perspectives on a very old subject, much of what is contained in these pages is also found in the collective wisdom of a hundred generations of law enforcement officers. Transported to the present day, the officers who paid Judas Iscariot his 30 pieces of silver and escorted him to the garden of betrayal would find the techniques of informant management little changed in the intervening 20 centuries. Certainly the outcome - a swift resolution, conviction, and sentence – is still the common result of an informant's cooperation, even in cases that otherwise defy solution for years.

We will be visiting with Sun Tzu throughout the book. Because he possessed significant insight into the secret world of informants and spies, the Chinese philosopher-warrior is quoted extensively. In The Art of War, he outlines principles a general can use to conquer his foes. Many of these principles are still valid today, and none more so than those which focus on the importance of the spies who collect the intelligence for the general who runs the war. Much of what Sun Tzu says is common sense, plainly understood by a thoughtful and interested student. He does, however, propose a fairly complex: system with respect to acquiring information for use in the war. Within this system are several types of informants who perform different functions and act for different reasons. As we shall see, the characteristics of the spies of Sun Tzu's ancient system are as likely to be found in the informants of the 21st century.

But understanding, rather than mere acceptance of, Sun Tzu's principles is required for our success. In order to realize the full potential of the confidential informant, it is necessary to understand the individual – how and why he behaves the way he does. This understanding transcends tactics. Therefore, the objective of this book is not to teach technique, although some techniques are discussed to provide insight. If we can understand why trust is so important in human relationships, we may understand why the betrayal of trust carries such a heavy burden. If we know the barriers to betrayal, we can understand some of the motivations, which cause people to pass those barriers. And, if we know what motivates people to inform, we can learn how to control the entire process, realizing the full potential of each informant.

This is a very challenging set of ifs, but the rewards are substantial. To illustrate how these rewards might be reached, the text refers to scores of criminal cases, all of which involve an in formant in some way. Each chapter also includes a case study that illustrates the principles discussed in that chapter. The cases outlined in the studies are well known to most in law enforcement. As such, they provide us with the opportunity to look at familiar facts from a new perspective. In our study of the informant, we should be analyzing these examples, not as a faultfinder, hoping to detect the mistakes or failings of another, but as a student who can learn from the experience of others.

The text and the case studies are designed to provide the reader with insight into the informant's life. The strains of this existence and the emotional pressures of informing are reflected in the actions of the characters of these short stories. It is my hope that by viewing these actions in light of the additional information and perspective of this book, we may better understand the informant. This understanding, more than a flat knowledge of procedures or techniques, will make law enforcement officers better able to develop and manage informants.

This ability is important, because informants solve cases in amazing numbers, not only in drug enforcement, where informants are indispensable, but also in crimes such as murder, terrorism, gambling, kidnapping, bank robbery, perjury, obstruction of justice, bootlegging, and assassination. These are some of the crimes that are described in the case studies. The law enforcement officer, regardless of his or her assignment or duties, can almost always benefit from the assistance of a good informant.

One of the themes of this book is that good informants are not born, but made, and the law enforcement officer is the maker. Whether we succeed or fail in this construction will depend upon the insight we have into the character of the person giving the information. Do you understand why he is here? Do you have all the information he possesses? Can you use the informant in an effective and ethical way to exploit the information he provides? If we are going to succeed in making the best use of informants, we are going to have to find the answers to these questions.

Informants work so well that, although they play a critical role in the American system of criminal justice, the use of informants is often attacked. Defense attorneys, civil libertarians, and the victims of informant betrayals all decry law enforcement's use of this investigative technique. Informants are criticized as intrusive, in violation of civil rights, abusive of due process, and just plain unfair. The pacts that are made to secure the cooperation of informants are routinely denounced as "deals with the devil." The worst of this condemnation is reserved for "paid" or "bought" informants who sell their information (and some would say. their souls) for mere money or those who seek a chance at a lighter sentence.

We must accept that there is more than just a grain of truth to these complaints. Informants are terribly intrusive. Some informants do lie, cheat, and violate the rights of the people we are supposed to be investigating. Some corrupt the officers with whom they work. Worst of all, the act of betrayal is often so catastrophic as to destroy relationships built up over decades. The effects of the informant's breach of faith are felt long after the judge's gavel falls.

Therefore, it behooves us to listen to the people who make these denunciations. Abuse of this investigative resource could result in official or judicial disapproval of informants, something that could, in turn, deprive society of law enforcement's most valuable tool. But, those who scorn the in formant should stop for a moment to consider the fact that it was an informant – a paid one, in fact – who reported plots to bomb bridges, tunnels, and other public places in New York City to the FBI. Had it not been for the actions of this informant in coming forward, thousands of Americans could have been killed.

That information was priceless and so was the informant who brought it to the attention of the FBI. As law enforcement professionals, we have a responsibility to protect that resource. We also have the obligation to employ this invaluable weapon in a way that preserves its usefulness for future cases. In this regard, we must find ways to employ informants in the most effective and ethical way possible. The purpose of this book is to provide some ideas about achieving this very worthy goal.

1. The Divine Manipulation of Threads

"Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge.” –Sun Tzu, The Art of War

"Good informant, good case. Bad informant, bad case. No informant, no case."–drug enforcement adage

Sun Tzu was a man who understood the value of information and knew a thing or two about how to get it. Simply put, he used spies, an ancient technique even in his time, 2000 years ago. History has shown over and over that such a person can provide the key to a city or unlock the door concealing a criminal conspiracy.

Whether the informant's tip prevents an act of international terrorism or leads to the arrest of a serial killer depends not so much on the informant himself, for many people may possess the information; rather, the potential of an informant is only realized through the effectiveness of the officer who works with and controls the flow of the information. By developing the skills needed to recruit and manage informants, the law enforcement officer can "strike, conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men."

This process is part art and part science – a blend that is as old as law, crime, and human weakness. Surprisingly, given the important role that informants have played in many criminal investigations, relatively little has been written about their employment. They are rarely featured in mystery novels or in film screenplays. There are a couple of reasons why this might be so. First, this may be due to the public's desire for their hero or heroine to triumph over ovenvhe1ming odds and solve crimes by sheer force of mind and will. Having someone come in and spoil the climax by telling us "whodunit" (and how and why) can diminish our champion. Second, there is a fundamental distrust in our culture and. indeed, in others around the world, of the informant.

Listen to the popular names for informants: "snitch," "rat," "stool-pigeon," "fink," "squealer." These are not terms of endearment or affection because people associate informants with treachery and betrayal. Even the very young are cautioned against "tattling" by their parents. Being told as a child that "nobody likes a tattletale" provided each or us with some early conditioning against the betrayal of confidences.

This well-entrenched animus makes informants unsympathetic characters, not only in fiction but in real life. Intelligence officers who work with the spies who are betraying their countries and police officers who work with the informants who betray their comrades in crime often describe very mixed feelings in their relationships with such persons. Although we will explore these conflicts in more depth later, they must be acknowledged as products of the early values instilled in people, which condemn disloyalty and breach of trust.

These negative attitudes are in direct conflict with the obligation of law enforcement officers to uphold the law by all of the legal means available to us. Employment of informants as one of these means has, in spite of our personal reservations, been a part of our legal system for hundreds, if not thousands of years. J. Edgar Hoover noted in the FBI's Law Enforcement Bulletin:

Experience demonstrates that the cooperation of individuals who can readily furnish accurate information is essential if law enforcement is to discharge its obligations. The objective of the investigator must be to ferret out the truth. It is fundamental that the search include the most logical source of information – those persons with immediate access to necessary facts who are willing to cooperate in the interest of the common good. Their services contribute greatly to the ultimate goal of justice – convicting the guilty and clearing the innocent. Necessarily unheralded in their daily efforts, they not only uncover crimes but also furnish the intelligence data so viral in preventing serious violations of law and traditional security.

There can be no doubt that the use of informants in law enforcement is justified. Tile public interest and the personal safety of these help fill citizens demand tile zealous protection of their confidence. Unlike the totalitarian practice, the informant in America serves of his own free will, fulfilling one of the citizenship obligations of our democratic form of government.

Mr. Hoover, who, despite his long service at the FBI, never personally worked an informant in his life, nevertheless clearly understood the importance of informants to law enforcement. Everything about informants is a study in conflict: Our parents' warning that "nobody likes a tattletale" directly contradicts Mr. Hoover's assertion that "the cooperation of individuals who can readily furnish accurate information is essential if law enforcement is to discharge its obligations." These two statements, both of which are completely true, graphically illustrate this basic dissonance. We, as a society, may not "like" the idea that a person is betraying a trust or telling someone else's secret, but we still need to have those people who do have inside information about crimes to come forward. We reluctantly accept the betrayal in favor of what most agree is the common good. The act of betrayal always exacts some sort of fee, however, and not just against the person betrayed. The very act of informing – the transfer of loyalties and the rejection of the convention against "tattling" – entails serious social and psychological conflict, fraught with all sorts of peril for the person informing, the officer who receives the information, and our society of laws.

There is obviously peril, also, for the person whose trust is betrayed. It is unlikely that the Unabomber, a man who eluded the police for over 17 years, would have been identified had not an informant – in this case, his brother – come forward with information. John Dillinger was caught as a result of an informant's cooperation with the FBI. An informant provided the critical information which led to the impeachment of President Bill Clinton. Informants have given advance word of presidential assassination plots, contract killings, robberies, and other terrible crimes. An informant told the Romans where to find Jesus Christ. Each of these actions represented a betrayal of someone's confidence, a breaking of someone's faith. This is the price we pay for information that can be of inestimable value.

A Study in Conflict

Sun Tzu. the Chinese philosopher-warrior enjoyed tremendous success on the battlefield but achieved his lasting fame as the author of the oldest known treatise on military science, The Art of War. One chapter of this essay is devoted to the means by which a general can obtain information, summarized as "The Use of Spies." In this chapter. Sun Tzu outlines a system for the employment of spies which he describes as "The Divine Manipulation of the Threads." This ancient system is eerily familiar to those who work with informants in our present day war on crime. This should remind us yet again that the value of secret information has been understood and appreciated probably for as long as people have been in conflict. This wily old soldier unquestionably knew the effect a spy's information could have on the outcome of a battle:

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one begrudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments {for spies] is rite height of inhumanity.

Is this not exactly the situation faced in the hunt for the Unabomber? A 17-year search costing millions of dollars came to an end with one name spoken by an informant. If crime, in general, or one person's crime spree is allowed to go unchecked, or if the criminal could be stopped through the use of a recognized investigative technique and is not, those in law enforcement would be failing in their duty to act. As Judge Learned Hand noted in United States v. Dennis (183 F.2d 201, 1950): "Courts have countenanced the use of informers from time immemorial." They have done so because an informant may be the only means by which a crime can be solved. To turn away from an informant who could have solved a case such as the Unabomber's before other innocents were killed would indeed be "the height of inhumanity."

The tradition of the American justice system calls for citizen involvement in crime prevention and control. As "peers" of the accused, citizens serve as jurors in criminal trials. Even before a case reaches trial, the citizen is expected, even required, in some cases, to bear witness against wrongdoers. Federal law (Title 18. U.S. Code. Sec. 4) describes the offense of misprision of felony as follows:

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

Although some states have similar statutes, others do not. Recently, in one of the latter states, a young man who witnessed at least part of a terrible rape-murder of a young girl could not be prosecuted because state law did not require that knowledge of such crimes be reported. Public outrage was directed at the witness, even to the extent that people protested against his presence on his university campus. Anger was also focused on the state, which found itself without the legal means to punish the witness for failing to do what was perceived as at least a moral duty, to turn in the perpetrator, a school chum.

As a result of this case, efforts are now underway to mandate the reporting of this type of crime, effectively forcing people, under pain of imprisonment, to become informants. There is precedent aside from the misprision of felony law. Doctors must report gunshot wounds encountered in the course of their practices. Teachers may be required to notify authorities of signs of physical or sexual abuse against their minor students. Government employees are obligated to report fraud, waste, or other malfeasance. Statutes such as these, sometimes referred to as "snitch laws," have proliferated as people seem to grow more remote from one another within society and less likely to "get involved" in the solving of crimes.

The statute books are laced with other, more positive incentives for citizen cooperation in the war on crime. In federal law, numerous provisions allow for the payment of rewards for information on a wide variety of crimes. There was a $1 million reward for the Unabomber suspect, and there is currently a $5 million reward for Osama bin Laden, the suspected mastermind behind terrorist bombings at American embassies overseas. The payment of rewards is, of course, not a new means of promoting citizen involvement in the resolution of crime. Reward posters from the age of piracy or the Wild West demonstrate an understanding by the authorities that, as Sun Tzu said, "to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one begrudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver" really is penny wise and pound foolish.

The need to offer rewards for information points out the beginning of a contradiction in attitudes, one which will persist throughout our discussion of informants. An observer completely ignorant of human nature might ask why, if assistance to law enforcement is one of the obligations of citizenship, is it necessary to offer money to those who provide the assistance? The answer is that there are numerous disincentives for that cooperation, all of which militate against giving something valuable for nothing. And information about crime is extremely valuable – in some cases more precious than gold – and apparently far more valuable than the warm, fuzzy feeling which accompanies doing one's civic duty. Two thousand years ago. Sun Tzu described the measure of these riches, and exactly where they could be found:

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

Information – the "foreknowledge" of which Sun Tzu speaks, has always been critical to effective law enforcement, of course. The entire investigative process is a search for facts, which come to us from a wide assortment of sources. As we occupy the "Information Age" and approach the 21st century, not only is the sheer volume of information greater than ever before, but so, too, is the variety of sources.

Despite the many advances in forensic science and technology, there is still only a limited number of ways to skin the criminal cat. One author, Richard Nossen, a former IRS Special Agent and administrator, identifies seven basic investigative techniques which can be used in the resolution of criminal cases. According to Nossen, these are

1. Surveillance

2. Acquisition and analysis of physical evidence

3. Interviewing and interrogation

4. Wiretapping and electronic surveillance

5. Undercover operations

6. Informants

7. Financial investigation

Some of these techniques are as old as Sun Tzu himself, while others would scarcely be recognized by law enforcement officers of even a generation ago. All have their places in the unending battle against crime, but, as cases old and new illustrate, none is as valuable as a well-placed informant.


What exactly is an informant, other than a person who fits all of the pejorative descriptions we heard earlier? An informant is the person who can provide the "knowledge of the enemy's dispositions," but how does he come by this knowledge and why does he tell us about it? Law enforcement agencies have come up with a number of less colorful (but less disparaging) descriptions of what constitutes an informant. The terms cooperating individual, cooperating witness, cooperating defendant, cooperating source, source of information, confidential source, restricted source, and confidential informant all describe "a person who provides information about a crime to law enforcement."

This definition is much too broad, however, for it includes casual observers who phone in anonymous tips to Crimestoppers or America's Most Wanted. The definition also encompasses witnesses to crimes, such as the tellers at a bank being robbed or the victims of a telemarketing scam. For that matter, it includes other law enforcement officers who share information with a colleague. None of these people would be considered "informants" in the popular definition.

A better definition of the informant includes a description of three qualifications that such a person must possess. Informants are people with access to information about crime. They become informants when they are somehow motivated to bring this to the attention of the police. These factors plus the control of the in formant and his information by the investigator are what make informants so essential to effective law enforcement, though not without considerable cost.

Motivation + Access + Control

These three attributes determine whether a person is or is not an informant. Without one or more, you've got something, but it is not an informant. Only someone who possesses all three characteristics will be effective as an informant. Our ability to develop and manage these individuals will provide us with the foreknowledge Sun Tzu cherished:

Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads … It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.

The Threads

As each of us proceeds on our respective paths through life, we weave around us a fabric of ties or bonds to others in our society. The threads in this fabric link us through association to friends, family, employers, co-workers ... to everyone our lives touch, directly or indirectly.

Some of the filaments are thin and weak; perhaps they represent a passing acquaintance or a half-forgotten school classmate. Other ties bind strong and tight: the bonds of blood, love, marriage, kinship, and long, intimate association. New threads are woven constantly, while others weaken or break, though none ever completely disappears. The result is a very large and very intricate tapestry, so complex that no one, not even the individual himself, can fully appreciate the pattern that surrounds him.

These threads form our connections to society, but in them are found the three elements of the informant, as well. One end of each thread obviously links to another person or group, providing the access that is required of anyone who would report the knowledge of a crime. And each strand is comprised not of wire or fiber, but of memories, emotions, values, and needs. Love, respect, honor, and pride compete with greed, ego, fear, longing, repentance, and the desire for revenge to weaken or strengthen the lies. The latter form the motivation for betrayal. Finally, those emotions, values, and needs afford the ability to control the informant and his information. This is the system that Sun Tzu called "the divine manipulation of the threads."

Every informant is unique in his or her access to information. Although more than one person might have similar knowledge of a crime, no two people could ever be completely alike in this regard. The motivations of these individuals will vary as well. Because all of us perceive our needs differently, our behavior in response to those needs will also differ. The individual response to discipline or control is also variable.


While there are quite a few high-priced books about how to work with CIs there are no books about Agent Provocateurs. Imagine that!



to be continued…

Written by Kris Millegan   

Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XXI

By Kris Millegan

Splitting HaresPart One

"We'll help you look for the lost sheep in the morning," he said, putting his arm around the youth,
"Nobody believes a liar...even when he is telling the truth!"
                                                                                                           –Aesop, The Shepherd Boy Who Cried Wolf


Confidential informants aren’t born, they are chosen.

Confidential informants may break the law – let alone ethics – with impunity.

Current federal regulations appear to be very specific as to what can and can’t be done to and by a confidential informant. (CI) These can be found at - purpose.

Here is a portion:


1. General Provisions 

a. A JLEA [Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency] shall not authorize a CI to engage in any activity that otherwise would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under federal, state, or local law if engaged in by a person acting without authorization, except as provided in the authorization provisions in paragraph (III)(C)(2) below.[emphasis added]

b. A JLEA is never permitted to authorize a CI to:

(i) participate in an act of violence;

(ii) participate in an act that constitutes obstruction of justice (e.g., perjury, witness tampering, witness intimidation, entrapment, or the fabrication, alteration, or destruction of evidence);

(iii) participate in an act designed to obtain information for the JLEA that would be unlawful if conducted by a law enforcement agent (e.g., breaking and entering, illegal wiretapping, illegal opening or tampering with the mail, or trespass amounting to an illegal search); or

(iv) initiate or instigate a plan or strategy to commit a federal, state, or local offense.

2. Authorization 

a. Tier 1 Otherwise Illegal Activity must be authorized in advance and in writing for a specified period, not to exceed 90 days, by:

(i) a JLEA's Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent); and

(ii) the appropriate Chief Federal Prosecutor.(8)

b. Tier 2 Otherwise Illegal Activity must be authorized in advance and in writing for a specified period, not to exceed 90 days, by a JLEA's Senior Field Manager.

c. For purposes of this paragraph, the "appropriate Chief Federal Prosecutor" is the Chief Federal Prosecutor that: (i) is participating in the conduct of an investigation by a JLEA that is utilizing that active CI, or is working with that active CI in connection with a prosecution; (ii) with respect to Otherwise Illegal Activity that would constitute a violation of federal law, would have primary jurisdiction to prosecute the Otherwise Illegal Activity; or (iii) with respect to Otherwise Illegal Activity that would constitute a violation only of state or local law, is located where the otherwise criminal activity is to occur. [emphasis added]

3. Findings 

a. The JLEA official who authorizes Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Illegal Activity must make a finding, which shall be documented in the CI's files, that authorization for the CI to engage in the Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Illegal Activity is --

(i) necessary either to --

(A) obtain information or evidence essential for the success of an investigation that is not reasonably available without such authorization, or

(B) prevent death, serious bodily injury, or significant damage to property;


(ii) that in either case the benefits to be obtained from the CI's participation in the Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Illegal Activity outweigh the risks.

b. In making these findings, the JLEA shall consider, among other things:

(i) the importance of the investigation;

(ii) the likelihood that the information or evidence sought will be obtained;

(iii) the risk that the CI might misunderstand or exceed the scope of his authorization;

(iv) the extent of the CI's participation in the Otherwise Illegal Activity;

(v) the risk that the JLEA will not be able to supervise closely the CI's participation in the Otherwise Illegal Activity;

(vi) the risk of violence, physical injury, property damage, and financial loss to the CI or others; and

(vii) the risk that the JLEA will not be able to ensure that the CI does not profit from his or her participation in the authorized Otherwise Illegal Activity. [emphasis added] 

Not quite a tight leash, but there is some stricture, and here is the rub, these “guidelines” only apply to Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency or JLEA, which consist of:

  • ·The Drug Enforcement Administration;
  • ·The Federal Bureau of Investigation;
  • ·The Immigration and Naturalization Service;
  • ·The United States Marshals Service; and
  • ·The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General.

Nothing is said about guidelines for the military, military intelligence agencies or the NSA, CIA or other intelligence agencies. Matter-of-fact the General Provisons state, “These Guidelines do not apply to the use of Confidential Informants in foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence investigations.” And “These Guidelines apply to the use of a Confidential Informant in a foreign country only to the extent that the Confidential Informant is reasonably likely to be called to testify in a domestic case.”

Does one interpret the absence of guidelines as “anything goes.”

The history of CIs is replete with abuse. Many times the CI also becomes an Agent Provocateur.


Traditionally, an agent provocateur (plural: agents provocateurs, French for "inciting agent(s)") is a person employed by the police or other entity to act undercover to entice or provoke another person to commit an illegal act. More generally, the term may refer to a person or group that seeks to discredit or harm another by provoking them to commit a wrong or rash action.

As a known tool to prevent infiltration by agents provocateurs, the organizers of large or controversial assemblies may deploy and coordinate demonstration marshals, also called stewards.

An agent provocateur may be a police officer or a secret agent of police who encourages suspects to carry out a crime under conditions where evidence can be obtained; or who suggests the commission of a crime to another, in hopes they will go along with the suggestion and be convicted of the crime.

A political organization or government may use agents provocateurs against political opponents. The provocateurs try to incite the opponent to do counter-productive or ineffective acts to foster public disdain—or provide a pretext for aggression against the opponent (see Red-baiting).

Historically, labor spies, hired to infiltrate, monitor, disrupt, or subvert union activities, have used agent provocateur tactics.

Agent provocateur activities raise ethical and legal issues. In common law jurisdictions, the legal concept of entrapment may apply if the main impetus for the crime was the provocateur.

United States

In the United States, the COINTELPRO program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had FBI agents pose as political radicals to disrupt the activities of political groups in the U.S., such as the Black Panthers, Ku Klux Klan, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.

New York City police officers were accused of acting as agents provocateurs during protests against the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City.

Denver police officers were also found to have used undercover detectives to instigate violence against police during the 2008 Democratic National Convention. This ultimately resulted in the accidental use of chemical agents against their own men.


Notorious were the activities of agents provocateurs against revolutionaries in Imperial Russia. Yevno Azef and Father Gapon are examples of such provocateurs.

Sir John Retcliffe was an agent provocateur for the Prussian secret police.

At the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, police and security services infiltrated black blocs with agents provocateurs. Allegations first surfaced after video footage in which "men in black were seen getting out of police vans near protest marches"

Francesco Cossiga, former head of secret services and Head of state of Italy, advised the 2008 minister in charge of the police, on how to deal with the protests from teachers and students:

He should do what I did when I was Minister of the Interior. [...] infiltrate the movement with agents provocateurs inclined to do anything [...] And after that, with the strength of the gained population consent, [...] beat them for blood and beat for blood also those teachers that incite them. Especially the teachers. Not the elderly, of course, but the girl teachers yes.

It is alleged by British Liberal Democrat MP Tom Brake that the Metropolitan Police made use of agents provocateurs during the G20 Protests in London.

After the 2011 anti-cuts protest in London, a video filmed by the BBC was distributed throughout the internet, which shows an alleged agent provocateur being passed through police lines after displaying his identification to the officers.

Here are some “case studies”:


The recent arrest of the potential Christmas tree bomber is reflective of the FBI's myopic strategy of using glitzy, expensive sting operations and dubious confidential informants to further erode Muslim American relations instead of concentrating on effective partnerships to combat radicalisation. The FBI is promoting the arrest of Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-born teenager accused of attempting to detonate a car bomb at a Christmas tree-lighting ceremony, as a triumph of effective law enforcement. Instead, the operation reeks of gratuitous self-adulation, requiring 6 months of time and precious expenditures to "uncover" a dummy terrorist plot wholly scripted and concocted by the FBI in the first place.

Although many argue that this was simply entrapment, evidence does indicate that Mohamud became increasingly radicalised and voluntarily continued with the FBI's fake terror plot. Regardless, CAIR attorney Zahra Billo told me, "The FBI seek out troubled people – nobody is arguing that some of these individuals aren't deeply troubled – and then enable and facilitate their aspirations. It is the FBI's job to stop operational terrorists. It is not the FBI's job to enable aspirational terrorists."

Attorney General Eric Holder recently suggested the use of such sting operations were "part of a forward-leaning way" in which law enforcement could proactively find those individuals committed to harming Americans, and a study revealed that 62% of terror prosecutions relied on confidential informants. But recent episodes suggest these tactics are neither "forward-looking", nor effective. Instead, they contribute towards a deepening, polarising wedge between law enforcement officials and some of their most important assets in the war against extremism: Muslim American communities.

Recently, a former FBI confidential informant, Craig Monteilh, humorously codenamed "Oracle", revealed he was paid $177,000 tax-free by the FBI to infiltrate and entrap a southern California Muslim community. The convicted forger, who went by "Farouk al-Aziz", was served with a restraining order by the mosque after he repeatedly pestered attendees with absurd conversations about engaging in violent jihad. Not to be deterred, the FBI heavily relied upon Oracle's superlative evidence, consisting of taped conversations, to indict an Afghan-American language instructor for allegedly making false statements regarding his ties to terrorists. Moreover, prosecutors alleged he was the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden's security coordinator.

Surely, this bombshell discovery paved the way for a successful prosecution and conviction? Nearly a year and a half later, the judge agreed with the prosecutors to dismiss the case citing lack of an overseas witness and "evidentiary issues". The result is a widening distrust of the FBI, since "the community feels betrayed," said Shakeel Syed, executive director of the Islamic shura council of southern California, an umbrella group of more than 75 mosques.

In the deeply flawed 2005 Lodi terror case, the FBI boasted of capturing two, alleged high-level terrorists, Hamid and Umer Hyatt – Pakistani father and son immigrants, who drove ice cream trucks for a living – based on the evidence of an unreliable Pakistani-American informant, codenamed "Wildkat". Indeed, his fact-finding lived up to his name, since he told the FBI he saw al-Qaida's number two man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, at his Lodi, California mosque. Although the FBI [thankfully] conceded his reporting as false, they nonetheless proceeded to pay him nearly $300,000 to infiltrate the sleepy Muslim community and scour for terrorists. His taped conversations with Umer Hyatt reveal him badgering and allegedly conning Umer to make incriminating statements. Furthermore, videotapes of the Hyatts' absurd alleged "confessions", which former veteran FBI agent James Wedick Jr reviewed and concluded were a result of illegal questioning and coaxing, nonetheless convinced a jury to convict Hamid of providing material support to terrorists and making false statements to the FBI.

Aside from a miscarriage of justice, perhaps the most poisonous result of such belligerent law enforcement procedures, is a "chilling effect" on the Muslim American community, in which citizens legitimately feel fear and alienation from, and a deepening mistrust of, their government, as a result of such harassment. "Time and again, Muslims prove themselves to be good and smart when it comes to reporting potential crimes. The problem with this method of law enforcement is that strains the very relationships that are critical to effective community policing," says Billo.

In a country where 60% of its citizens claim to not know a Muslim and 45% regard Islam as a religion that promotes violence, these self-aggrandising displays of "successful" prosecutions also contribute to the volatile climate of anti-Muslim bigotry and reactionary rhetoric. Recently, Glenn Beck delved into his hyperactive, paranoid imagination to produce the utterly baseless statistic that nearly 10% of Muslims are terrorists. Although many of Beck's audience will not question the veracity of his "facts", a comprehensive study undertaken by Duke University reveals that the number of radicalised Muslim-Americans remains very small. The study reports that "Muslim American communities have been active in preventing radicalisation… This is one reason that Muslim American terrorism has resulted in fewer than three dozen of the 136,000 murders committed in the United States since 9/11."

Thus, a Senegalese Muslim immigrant was the first to witness and report failed jihadist Faisal Shahzad's burning car in Times Square. A Muslim American community in Virginia went to local law enforcements and the FBI after discovering troubling videotapes left by five youths who allegedly went to Pakistan to commit jihad. A convert to Islam tipped off the FBI about the Christian militant group, the Hutarees, who were planning a terrorist attack on American soil. Even the Nigerian underwear bomber's own father warned British authorities that his son was radicalised and could potentially harm himself and others.

Undoubtedly, radicalisation and terrorism are real threats, which afflict all US citizens, regardless of race or religion. Perhaps the FBI should now cease treating most Muslim American citizens as potential suspects, whose privacy rights and civil liberties are now curtailed in clumsy ways – such as faulty GPS tracking devices sloppily attached on their cars. Perhaps the FBI needs to spend its considerable (taxpayer-paid-for) resources to re-engage them as partners and allies – instead of contributing to the heightened climate of fear and paranoia by employing shady informants with cheesy, comic-book codenames.


Mark Kennedy: Confessions of an undercover cop

After seven years spent living as an environmental activist, Mark Stone was revealed to be policeman Mark Kennedy. He talks to Simon Hattenstone about life on the outside, with no job, no friends and no idea who he really is

The Guardian, Saturday 26 March 2011

Article history


Mark Kennedy: 'I was lying because it was my job to lie. I'm not a dishonest person.' Photograph: Philipp Ebeling

There are two distinct images of Mark Kennedy that have emerged in the press. The first is a long-haired, unshaven, multi-earringed rebel – that is Kennedy the undercover cop in his role as eco-activist "Mark Stone". The second is a man with short hair, swept to the side, clean-shaven, so spruce you can almost smell the soap – the "real" Mark Kennedy, returned from life undercover.

Today, it takes me a while to recognise him. He could be a composite – the hair is longer and unkempt, the face unshaven, tattoos are on display under his rolled-up sleeve. He seems to be morphing back into the eco-activist before my eyes.

Kennedy was an undercover police officer who spent seven years infiltrating a group of environmental activists under the alias Mark Stone. In 2009, as protesters planned to occupy and temporarily shut down one of Britain's biggest coal-fired power stations at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in Nottinghamshire, Kennedy passed on the information to his handlers. Nottinghamshire police subsequently arrested 114 people in a late-night swoop. Among them was "Stone" himself, who faced a prison sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass. Kennedy was trapped – if he was not charged, it would blow his cover, yet he couldn't appear in court as somebody who did not actually exist. In the end, the case collapsed, leaving a trail of collateral damage – up to £1m lost on the trial, hundreds of thousands wasted on his surveillance work, a community torn apart, lives shattered.

The story led to four ongoing inquiries about the nature of undercover policing and questions in parliament: did the environmental protesters need to be monitored so closely? Wasn't it a waste of police time and taxpayers' money? Were police acting as agents provocateurs? Did they have any right to inveigle their way into people's lives in such a manner? The story caught the popular imagination, not least because it emerged that for many of his years undercover, Kennedy – who was married with children – was involved in a serious relationship with one of the activists.

What kind of man could do that: nurture, befriend and ultimately love a group of people, then betray them? Kennedy, 41, wants to tell his side of the story. But at times he no longer seems sure what that story is.

He grew up in Orpington, Kent. His mother was a housewife, his father a traffic police officer. At 19, Kennedy also joined the police. He considered himself a modern cop with modern attitudes – he had no time for the old racist views, was sympathetic to protesters in the environmental movement, and believed the job of the police was to enable society to operate fairly and democratically. He worked initially in uniform, then undercover in south London, buying drugs and weapons from dealers and passing information back to Scotland Yard. He was good at the job and was headhunted by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, a secret body that runs an intelligence database of political activists. They asked him to help expose race-hate crimes – more undercover work. This was just the kind of thing he had joined the police to do. Again, he was successful. It was then suggested that he hook up with a group of environmental activists in Nottinghamshire. Yes, it was infiltration and, yes, it involved spying on people he regarded largely as good guys, but he convinced himself he was on the side of the angels – if he could tip the wink to his handlers about extremists and demonstrations, they could be policed efficiently and he would be working as a good officer while assisting a movement to which he was sympathetic. Of course, if his fellow activists had known this at the time, they would have regarded it all very differently.

"My role was to gather intelligence so appro priate policing could take place," Kennedy says. "It wasn't to prevent people from demonstrating. I met loads of great people who would go out every weekend and show their concern and demonstrate. Then there were other people who would want to take things further and maybe want to break into somewhere or destroy things, and then you start infringing on the rights of other people to go about their lawful business."

Kennedy still talks like an officer. His sentences are punctuated with words such as "tasked", "gatherings" and "proportionate policing". We meet at the offices of the publicist Max Clifford, whose help Kennedy sought when he reached a nadir. He had lost everything – his old friends, his family, his activist friends. I had expected a cool, confident man – a James Bond or Jason Bourne – but Kennedy is fidgety and diffident. His neck reddens as he talks and only one eye focuses because of a childhood accident (at two, he climbed inside a cardboard box and a loose staple ripped an ocular muscle). After a few minutes he starts to stammer – a schoolboy affliction that has only recently returned.

It was not easy to immerse himself among the activists, he says. They were a group of close-knit friends, many of whom had known each other since school. He went to meetings and marches, and gradually became accepted. The more involved he became, the more he changed physically. His hair grew long enough to wear in a ponytail, he got more piercings and tattoos. Gradually, he proved himself an indispensable comrade – he could drive (many activists couldn't or wouldn't), he had money (made, he said, by drug dealing in Pakistan – he told the activists he now wanted to turn his life around), he was a skilled climber and, perhaps most importantly, he was popular.

Somehow, he successfully managed both lives. While Stone had a thrilling time visiting 22 countries on a false passport, demonstrating against the building of a dam in Iceland, touring Spain with eco-activists, picketing arms fairs in London and penetrating anarchist networks in Germany and Italy, Kennedy quietly slipped information back to the police, even managing occasionally to get back to visit his wife, Edel, and two young children in Ireland. The couple were estranged, but maintained they were together for the sake of the children (four and two when he went undercover in 2002). If they asked, he would tell the activists that he was working away for a few days as an industrial climber.

Did he have to be an incredibly good liar to do this job? "Yes." Was he always a good liar? "Not in that sense. I was lying because it was my job to lie. I'm not a dishonest person. I had to tell lies about who Mark Stone was and where he was from for it to be real." He pauses. "To be fair, a lot of the things you do, say and talk about are very much based upon who you are as a person and the places you've been to and the things you've done, because five years later somebody will go, 'Ah, Mark, didn't you say you went here?' and you have to remember that. So a lot of the things I would talk about were pretty true."

Such deceit was on a different level from what he'd practised on the streets, buying drugs and guns. "If I'm going to buy a kilo of coke, the dealer doesn't really want to know me that well; it's all about the commodity. But this is different. People don't actually want anything from you – all they want is to know you and be your friend."

Is it possible to do the job without becoming paranoid? "I'd use a different phrase. I never became complacent." That's a very different phrase, I say. He ums and ahs and stutters his way to a conclusion. "I never… I always liked to... I suppose I was a little bit paranoid." Can you do the job without it mentally unbalancing you? "I don't know." Where does Kennedy end and Stone begin? "Well... there is no line. You just can't say." He finally reaches a conclusion of sorts: "I always have understood and had a concern for the issues I was infiltrating. I don't think you could do this work if you didn't care about the climate."

Perhaps that is what ultimately made life impossible for Kennedy: he wanted to honour both sides – be the honest cop and the genuine activist. But in the end he was caught in the middle, despised as a Judas by both sides.

Kennedy experienced heavy-handed policing first-hand. In 2006 he was beaten up by officers on the perimeter fence of the Drax power station. He says he was trying to protect a woman being hit on the legs with a baton when he was jumped by five uniformed officers – they were there only because he had tipped off his handlers. "They kicked and beat me. They had batons and pummelled my head. One officer repeatedly stamped on my back. I had my finger broken, a big cut on my head and a prolapsed disc." There were plenty of other incidents, he says. "I experienced a lot of unjust policing. At times, I was appalled at being a police officer."

But he says that some of the best things in his life also happened as Mark Stone – and not just the dramatic stuff. "There are some amazing social centres that are all voluntary-based. Take the Sumac Centre in Nottingham, a community garden that provides free food. If you had a social centre like that in every city, it would be great. And I was fortunate enough to be involved in that and see how it works."

And this became his community? "Yes. So many people I knew, or Mark Stone knew, became really good friends. It wasn't just about being an activist all the time."

I ask if he ever wanted to be Stone, and he gives a surprising answer. No, he says, because it was so frustrating failing to achieve what he had set out to do. "There was a lot of commitment and effort and tears put into things that didn't change anything." The activists were too conservative? "Yeah, I would say, and just very small in numbers." Actually, he says, they were a bit useless at the most basic things – an effective group of protesters needs a number of competent climbers, to scale fences and gain access to buildings and power plants, and there were hardly any. Recently, it was announced there wouldn't be a climate camp this year, and that horrifies him. What better time to discuss the environment and policing and all the issues that have come about with his case?

It's bewildering listening to Kennedy make the case for a more radical and committed group of ecowarriors. The bottom line is that he went in to betray them and did just that. Does he feel guilty? "It's something I find very hard to think about. When you're on the front line in a riot situation, the people around you are your buddies. Everybody looks out for each other, and I experienced that on numerous occasions. There were people who, if they had only a couple of quid left, would buy you a pint. So, yes, there are some great people who didn't need to be reported on. They believed I was something else, and that hurts a lot."

And then there are the women. Those in the environment movement claim Kennedy had many sexual relationships through the years, and some believe it was a systematic means of gaining trust and gathering intelligence. One woman with whom he had a relationship overseas said she felt "violated" when he was outed as a police officer. Kennedy maintains there were only two relationships, one of which was serious.

Look, I say, it's easy to talk about the trauma of betraying a guy who buys you a pint, but when it's a lover, surely that's on a different level? Silence.

"For me, that whole kind of incident..." He starts again. "That's not the right word. I felt in some ways that I was really alone, that I was the only person as an undercover officer who had ever done that; subsequently, I discovered everyone was doing it. The person I had the relationship with is an amazing person, a really amazing person. The love I shared with her and the companionship we shared was the realest thing I ever did." More real than his marriage? "Yeah, there were no lies about that at all," he says without irony.

How did he feel when he was in bed at night? Was there not part of him desperate to confess? "Yes, all the time. All the time. Yes." But how could he continue in a relationship with someone who might be the love of his life and know it's all based on a lie? "It's one for the psychologists," he says quietly. "It's just how it was. I don't know." Did he never think of coming clean, begging forgiveness and leaving the police? "No, no. I'm not saying it didn't cross my mind, it just wasn't a realistic proposition. It would never have worked." Because he'd have ended up rejected by both sides? "Absolutely." He looks at me. "You know, our relationship was remarked upon in the activist community as being a great relationship."

Things reached a head in April 2009, when the activists planned to break into the Ratcliffe-on-Soar power plant. It was initially suggested that "Stone" climb the power plant, but he refused. This was Kennedy the good policeman – if he led the protesters, any subsequent case could collapse because he would be regarded as an agent provocateur. He says he told his handlers that he had passed on all the necessary information and didn't want to be part of the protest, but they told him they wanted him there. He eventually agreed to drive a lorry. He recorded two meetings held at Iona school on 12 and 13 April, where protesters discussed shutting down the plant, and passed on the recordings. At one point activists heard there had been a leak and that security had gathered at the power station. According to activists, it was Kennedy who went to recce the station and reported back that all was clear.

On 14 April, the day before the planned takeover, the police arrested 114 activists. While the other 113 shared one law firm, Bindmans, Kennedy's handlers said he did not need one because he was a police officer. "I said, look, everybody else has got a solicitor, Mark Stone hasn't – it looks really odd. They said, don't worry about it, and I said, well, I have to worry about it because I'm now on bail to go back to be re-interviewed." The Nottinghamshire detectives had no idea that an undercover officer was involved. "As far as they were concerned, they were interviewing Mark Stone, a thorn in their side for the past seven years – he's a catch, let's make sure we push charges."

Every day for three months, Kennedy phoned his handlers to ask what was happening, and heard nothing. Eventually, a week before the day on which he and 26 others had been told they would be charged, the case against him was dropped. He had suggested that if he was released without charge, the other drivers should be, too, to avoid suspicion, but he was ignored and all the remaining 26 activists were charged. It left him in an impossible situation. "It totally exposed me. To sit in a pub with everyone else and for them to say, 'How did you get off?' What could I say? I didn't say anything. That was hugely stressful. Certainly it raised a lot of questions among people."

Soon after the case was dropped, he received a message from his handlers: the surveillance operation was being dropped and he was to tell the activists that he was leaving to visit family in America for an indefinite period.

When he returned to the Met in October 2009, he discovered two alarming things – one, his time undercover had left him out of touch; and two, he was now a pariah in police circles. "Over seven years, there was no training or keeping me up to speed with what was going on in the police. So when I went back, I probably wasn't even qualified to drive a Panda, didn't know how to use a radio. I didn't know how any of the systems worked. I went for an interview with the personnel department and they didn't even have my file." When they asked Kennedy what he wanted to do now, he told them, "I need a role that keeps me off the streets, reasonably covert, some kind of detective job." That was all very well, they said, but he'd have to apply like anyone else. "They said, 'We can't give you a job on merit of having done a good job before. You're not really qualified to do anything.'

"I was not looked after at all. I didn't think there was anything left for me in the police, so I left." Kennedy does not believe he is alone. He says he has talked to other former undercover officers who feel they were cast aside on their return to mainstream policing and later left the service suffering from post-traumatic stress.

In early 2010, he returned as Mark Stone to his friends in Nottingham. Perhaps he didn't know where else to go. He wanted to try to make things work with his girlfriend – or at the very least provide a more satisfactory ending to their relationship and his years among the protesters. (He had done a course on servicing wind turbines, and told his old friends he was going to travel the world doing that.) But when they were on holiday last July, his girlfriend came across a passport belonging to Mark Kennedy in the glove compartment of his van. Again, he lied and told her he had many passports from his drug smuggling days.

She might have given him the benefit of the doubt, but when she told the other activists, they did not. They demanded a meeting in which he was quizzed for four hours. "I was absolutely shitting myself. They sat in a semicircle around me. It was hugely menacing. I told them nothing to start with. They just kept saying they knew I was a cop, that I was married with kids. They knew my mum. They knew my home address." Eventually he broke down, and that was when they brought in his girlfriend. "The look of devastation on her face destroyed me."

He was asked to make a statement confessing everything. He said he would think about it, then ran away. Was it a relief that he was forced to come clean? He nods. "Yeah, a huge relief." He stops to correct himself. "Later it became a relief, after the initial shock."

He hoped to manage his own public outing, but was overtaken by events. Last December, 20 of the charged activists were convicted of trespass offences. Then, in January, the case of the remaining six collapsed. There were a number of stories circulating as to why – and Kennedy was at the centre of them all. One suggested that he had gone native – in one recorded phone conversation, he suggested he could give evidence for the defence and said the police tactics with which he was involved were like using "a hammer to crack a nut". Another version of events suggested that by taking such an active role in the protest, he had become an agent provocateur. But, ultimately, the case seems to have collapsed for less noble reasons – it is thought the CPS realised that the evidence Kennedy had recorded at the school actually helped the activists, showing that most were still making up their minds about whether and how to participate. If that was the case, the prosecution could not win – if they used the evidence, they undermined their own case; if they didn't use it, the defence would accuse them of non-disclosure.

Kennedy found himself front-page news. There was a rush of stories about him and, appropriately enough, it was impossible to distinguish fact from fiction. It was suggested that he had set up his own companies after leaving the police (true – he says he planned to start a business abseiling down skyscrapers to clean their windows) and that he had worked in private security spying on the activists after he had left the police (false, he insists – he was asked to advise a company on trends in activism, but says he declined).

According to Kennedy, the police did their utmost to distance themselves from him, telling reporters in off-the-record briefings that he was "a bad apple" and wholly unrepresentative of undercover officers. But a week after he was exposed in the national press, a number of similar stories emerged, including that of undercover officer Jim Boyling, who had married an activist he met while infiltrating Reclaim The Streets.

By now Kennedy had nowhere left to run. Every bridge was burned – he had not seen his children for three months, and neither the police nor the protesters wanted anything to do with him. He wasn't sleeping, barely eating, and was terrified. He was hiding in America, convinced his former police bosses were looking for him and that activists wanted revenge. A group of German anarchists said they hoped Kennedy "spends the rest of his life looking over his shoulder. That is the minimum price he should have to pay." In the US he told a psychiatrist that he was suicidal.

Kennedy returned to England in a desperate state but, having no fixed address, he could not sign up to a GP. While undercover, he should have received an assessment from a police psychologist every three months, but claims he went two whole years without even one. He also says he received no counselling from the police when he was removed from undercover work. When asked if they were remiss in their pastoral care, both the Metropolitan police and National Public Order Intelligence Unit declined to comment in light of ongoing inquiries.

"I felt hugely alone," Kennedy says. He looks away. "Still do. It was a really dark time. I had two choices: I was either going to top myself or try to get some help."

All the time we've been talking, I've wondered one thing: how would he have felt if his girlfriend had ended up in prison because of his actions? For the first time he seems shocked by a question. "She was nothing to do with anything." Why not? "She was doing something else." By chance, she was not involved in that particular protest. And if she had been? "It didn't occur to me."

As for the future, he hasn't a clue what it holds. There is a documentary being made about him, talk of a movie, even, but he knows that's not going to see him through the rest of his working life. He says he'd like to use his experience to show people that police officers and activists don't always fit a neat stereotype, but he's not sure how. For now, though, he says, he has plenty of work to do on himself. This week he is visiting his family to try to make a fresh start with the children. He says they were distraught to see him in the newspapers, and admits that his daughter is "quite frosty" with him.

Does he think people will ever trust him again? "Do you mean people I used to associate with? No, never. Never. I shattered that trust, I accept that."

Does he think he will ever be able to trust himself again? "In what way?" he asks. Well, I say, is he confident that he knows who he is now?

"No, not at all. Deep down, I know I have these core values, but it's going to be a long process to find out who I am."


to be continued…

Written by Kris Millegan   

Allegations regarding "Butch" Merritt, Watergate, Intelligence Agencies and "Crimson Rose," Vol. XX

By Kris Millegan

EndgamePart Seven

David Rockefeller came in, apparently to induce me to let the shah come to the United States.
Rockefeller, Kissinger, and Brzezinski seem to be adopting this as a joint project.
                                                                                                  –Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, April 9 1979



In the midst of Watergate, Richard Nixon sent career CIA official Richard Helms to Iran as the US Ambassador in January of 1973. Helms had gone to prep school with the Shah in Switzerland and the CIA had put the Shah in power in 1953. Helms served as Ambassador for three years.

The next, and our last accepted, Ambassador to Iran was William H. Sullivan, he had been the ambassador to Laos from 1964-1969, and had personally supervised the most intensive bombing of that country. During this same time opium trafficking in Laos was being supported by American “interests.” Infamous CIA agent Theodore Shackley was the CIA Chief of Station in Laos from 1966-68, and then moved on to Saigon where he served as Station Chief until 1972.

Ted Shackley had an interesting career, from Wiki:

Miami and the Cuban crisis

Shackley was station chief in Miami, Florida during the period of (1962 - 1965). While heading the CIA office (known as "JMWAVE") shortly after the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Shackley dealt with operations in Cuba (alongside Edward Lansdale). JMWAVE employed more than 200 CIA officers, who handled approximately 2,000 Cuban agents. These included the famous "Operation Mongoose" (aka "The Cuban Project"). The aim of this was to "help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime" (of Fidel Castro Ruz). During this period as Miami Station Chief, Shackley was in charge of around 400 agents and general operatives (as well as a huge flotilla of boats), and his tenure here encompassed the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of October 1962. {emphasis added]

Vietnam, Laos and the "Phoenix Program"

In 1966, Shackley moved on to the Vietnam War, becoming the CIA station chief in Laos between 1966-1968, where he directed the CIA's secret war of pitting the Hmong villagers against Vietcong who used the Ho Chi Minh Trail. He also helped coordinate local army efforts against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Army in the northern regions of Laos.

He then moved on to become station chief for Vietnam (in what was then Saigon) in 1968. Despite popular opinion Shackley did not in fact run the Phoenix Program. Phoenix was alleged to be an assassination campaign aimed at members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. Allegations that thousands of civilians were killed is not supported by historical evidence. After the US Bureau of Narcotics' "Operation Eagle" busted a drug-running scheme in 1970, several of the Cuban-Americans involved in the Bay of Pigs Invasion came to work for Shackley and Donald Gregg in Vietnam, including Felix Rodriguez. The Phoenix Program was eventually handed over to the U.S. and South Vietnamese armies. Shackley served in Vietnam through February 1972 when he returned to Langley, Virginia. [emphasis added]

Western Hemisphere Division and Chile

From 1972, Shackley ran the CIA's "Western Hemisphere Division".When Shackley took over the Western Hemisphere division in 1972, one mission for him was "regime change" in Chile.

One of Shackley's jobs whilst in charge of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division was to discredit ex-CIA officer believed to have become under control of the KGB, Philip Agee who was writing an "expose" on the CIA entitled Inside The Company. After Shackley's best efforts to discredit Agee, the parts of the book that would have caused most damage to the reputation of the CIA were not included.

Deputy Director of Covert Operations

In May 1976, Shackley was made Deputy Director of Covert Operations, serving under director George H.W. Bush, before officially retiring from the organization in 1979. However, it has been widely reported that in reality he was forced out of the organization by Bush's successor as Director, Stansfield Turner. Turner disapproved of Shackley’s close involvement with agent Edwin P. Wilson and ex-CIA employee, Frank Terpil. [emphasis added]


From Wiki:

Opium in Iran is widely available, and the country has the highest per capita number of opiate addicts in the world at a rate of 2.8% of Iranians over age 15. The Iranian Government estimates the number of addicts at 2 million. Opium and heroin from Afghanistan and Pakistan --known collectively as the Golden Crescent-- pass through Iran's eastern borders in large amounts. Total annual opium intercepts by the Iranian authorities are larger than in any other country, but the government admits that they can only intercept a tiny proportion of the thousands of tonnes that are trafficked through Iran every year. Opium costs far less in Iran than in the West, and is even cheaper than beer. In Zahedan, an Iranian town near the Pakistani border, 3 grams of opium can be purchased for 10,000 Iranian rials, equivalent to $1 USD, and 1kg costs the equivalent of $330. In Zabol, $1 buys 5g of Afghan opium. In addition to having a low price, opium is popular because alcohol is haram (forbidden in Islam), and more tightly controlled by the Iranian Government. According to official Iranian government reports, within Tehran the daily consumption of opium is 4 metric tons. According to UNODC estimates, 450 metric tons of opium are consumed in Iran each year. [emphasis added]


Opium and the CIA they appear to go well together. Traditionally, Iran has been one of the world’s largest suppliers of opium. In the 1949 United Nations report about the world production of opium, Iran was named as “one of the chief opium-producing and exporting countries” in the world.

Ok, back to Watergate, Nelson Rockefeller didn’t get to be President. After the “Halloween Massacre,” he wasn’t even on the ticket anymore. But brother David had a “friend,” Jimmy Carter, who could keep the seat warm, and if Jimmy wasn’t co-operative he could easily be “dismissed.”

Left to right: Andy Messing Jr., Edwin Lansdale, Medadro Justinano, John Singlaub and Oliver North

According to the Washington Post, North “was already Lansdale-ized when he reached the NSC.” How did that happen?


The Secret Team, Part III: Chaos in Laos

The Secret Team Enters South-East Asia

By John Bacher

More bombs were dropped on Laos between 1965 and '73 than the US had dropped on Japan and Germany during World War II. More than 350,000 people were killed. The war in Laos was a secret only from the American people and Congress. It anticipated the sordid ties between drug trafficking and repressive regimes that have been seen later in the Noriega affair.

AFTER THE CLOSING DOWN OF the United States's secret war in Cuba, CIA agents Theodore Shackley and Tom Clines were sent eastward to set up a far more massive secret war in Laos. Like its previous "Operation Success," "Mongoose" and "JM/Wave" assignments, the team was presented with another "mission impossible" -- to prop up a reactionary U.S. client state with little indigenous popular support. That the mission succeeded as well as it did, from 1965 to 1973, was only possible because of massive narcotics smuggling and saturation bombing which tended to overshadow any national foreign policy objective.

Prior to the arrival of the Secret Team in Laos, the U.S. had a sordid history of the destruction of neutralist Laotian governments with broad political support, since the country received its independence from France in 1954. The CIA engineered coups in 1958, 1959, 1960, and possibly on other occasions, as William Blum has documented in his The CIA: A Forgotten History. Such manipulation had the effect of driving the Pathet Lao (Communist Party) out of the political arena and into military conflict in alliance with North Vietnam. U.S. President John F. Kennedy did have the intelligence to see the absurdity of this situation and obtained a coalition government with the Pathet Lao backed by international agreement. This neutral regime was, however, overthrown in 1964 by a right wing coup, giving effective control to reactionary generals with close ties to the CIA.To stabilize this regime with so little popular support, the CIA sent Theodore Shackley and Tom Clines to Laos in 1964.

Unlike the war in Vietnam, the secret war in Laos remained in the hands of the CIA and avoided direct deployment of U.S. troops. This lack of American casualties tended to hide its massive scale. After the war's end, the New York Times observed that "some 350,000 men, women and children have been killed, it is estimated, and a tenth of the population of three million uprooted." Between 1965 and 1973, more than two million tons of bombs were dropped on Laos -- far more than the U.S. had dropped on both Japan and Germany during World War II. This bombing was applied to all regions controlled by the Pathet Lao. A former American community worker in Laos, Fred Branfam, described how "village after village was levelled, countless people burned alive by high explosives, or by napalm and white phosphorous, or riddled by anti-personnel bomb pellets." In order to wreck the economy in the Pathet Lao area, the U.S. dropped millions in forged currency. At the end of the war in Laos, the Plain of Jars resembled a lunar landscape marked by bomb craters,"stark testimony to the years of war that denuded the area of people and buildings." Irrigation works collapsed and so many water buffalo had been killed in the war that farmers had to harness themselves to the plows to till fields. Unexploded ordnance are still killing and hampering food production. Such weaponry includes fragmentation weapons with explosives and steel bits released from large canisters.

THE ROYAL LAO ARMY HAD PROVEN unreliable to prop up John Foster Dulles's puppet American regimes in the '50s, which were often overthrown by nationalistic officers. Therefore Shackley and Clines developed their own secret army, based on the discontented Meo tribal minority and financed by the narcotics trade. Meo villages that refused to send troops to fight in this secret army were bombed by the U.S. Air Force, as Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman point out in After the Cataclysm. To suit U.S. strategic needs, villages were relocated. Besides 15,000 Meo tribesmen, the secret army included 15,000 mercenaries from Thailand, and U.S.-trained soldiers from South Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. The New York Times quipped that the "Secret Army" was secret only from "the American people and Congress." American advisers killed in Laos were reported to have died in Vietnam.

ONE objective of Shackley and Clines was to monopolize the opium trade in Laos for their Meo ally, Van Pao. In 1965 Van Pao's opium trafficking competitors were assassinated.

After the end of the Indochina war, the CIA admitted that "certain elements" of its war organization had been involved in opium smuggling. As Henrick Kruger points out in The Great Heroin Coup (Black Rose, 1980), the CIA was forced to admit this because of reports of returning U.S. veterans. One report, by highly-decorated Green Beret Paul Withers, explained that one of his main tasks had been "to buy up the entire crop of opium" of the Meo tribe. About once a week an Air America (a CIA owned company) plane, he reported, "would arrive with supplies and kilo bags of opium, which were loaded on the plane. Each bag was marked with the symbol of the tribe." Air American flights were exempted from normal customs inspections. In 1971 some 60 kilos of heroin (worth $13.5 million) were seized from the briefcase of the chief Laotian delegate of the World Anti-Communist League.

Shackley and Clines also developed a program to use their secret army for "unconventional warfare" activities, including political assassinations. This is detailed in the lawsuit of the Christic Institute. In 1966 a multi-service operation, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam -- Special Operations Group (MACV-SOG) was formed. From 1966-1968 this group supported the assassination activities of the secret army and was commanded by future World Anti-Communist League president and Contra fundraiser, General John K. Singlaub. Serving under Singlaub in Laos in 1968 was the then Second Lieutenant Oliver North. [emphasis added]

From 1968 to 1971 Theodore Shackley and Tom Clines supervised the Special Operations Group in Laos. The secret army assassinated over 100,000 noncombatant villagers: mayors, bookkeepers, clerks and other political figures in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. These killings established a foundation of terror for the Laotian government, undermined Prince Norodom Sihanouk's efforts to steer a neutral course for Cambodia, and discouraged the growth of democracy in Thailand. The style of terror resembled the random killings of Colonel Kurtz's Montagnards in the film Apocalypse Now. Unfortunately movie watchers are deceived into thinking such madness would bring official punishment instead of promotions.

The antics of the Secret Team in Laos would be a prelude to even more destructive activities in Vietnam, where their program of narcotics smuggling and assassination would develop even greater scope. This war was too massive to let the brunt of the fighting to fall to tribal minorities and foreign mercenaries, causing America to officially enter Southeast Asia.

The U.S. client state's government became so deeply involved in illegal activities, such as the heroin trade and thievery, that it more resembled an organized crime syndicate than a coalition of conservative political parties. The terrorist operations of the Secret Team in Vietnam, such as the infamous Phoenix Program, destroyed both the "third force" and the communist-led National Liberation Front, tending to make the domination of the area by North Vietnam the inevitable outcome of the conflict.


Carter needed to go. From

IV. The Hostage Rescue Mission

On April 23, 1980, an abortive Iranian hostage rescue mission took place, conducted under the utmost secrecy. The plan was to storm the American embassy in Tehran, and bring home the hostages.

8 helicopters, 6 C-130 transport planes, and 93 Delta force commandoes secretly invaded Iran. They were to rendezvous at a place in Iran they called Desert One, move out to another point called Desert Two, and then go on to Tehran to rescue the hostages. But Delta force never made it to Desert Two or Tehran. The mission was aborted after three of the eight helicopters failed, on the way to Desert One. The operation was a miserable failure, resulting in an accident that caused the loss of 8 American lives. Later investigation revealed a surprising level of negligence.

Just before the rescue mission took place, several other countries had finally agreed to level economic sanctions on Iran. Some of them agreed to the sanctions because they thought that if they did, the U.S. would not take any military action. They were quite irate when they heard about the rescue mission after the fact.

At least three central figures in the Iran-Contra Scandal were involved with the Iranian hostage rescue mission: Secord, Hakim, and North.

General Richard Secord helped to organize the abortive rescue mission. After the first mission failed, he was the head of the planning group that eventually decided against another rescue attempt. Because the whereabouts of the hostages were unknown, the second rescue attempt (the October Surprise that the Reagan-Bush campaign was so worried about) never happened.

Secord was later suspended from his Pentagon post because of the EATSCO probe. EATSCO is a company that belongs to Edwin Wilson, the CIA operative who is currently serving time in a federal maximum-security prison for, among other things, secretly supplying 43,000 pounds of plastic explosives to Kadaffi. [emphasis added]

In 1981, he became Chief Middle East arms-sales adviser to Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger.

Albert Hakim is a wealthy arms merchant, an Iranian exile, and CIA informant, who had a "sensitive intelligence" role in 1980 hostage rescue. He worked for the CIA near the Turkish boarder, handling the logistics of the rescue mission in Tehran. Hakim purchased trucks and vans, and rented a warehouse on the edge of Tehran to hide them in until they were needed for the operation. Unexpectedly however, he skipped town the day before the rescue mission. Later on, in July, 1981, Hakim approached the CIA, with a plan to gain favor with the Iranian government by selling it arms.

Oliver North led a secret detachment to eastern Turkey. He was in the mother ship on the Turkish border awaiting the cue from Secord to fly into Teheran and rescue the hostages. [2] [25] After the first aborted rescue mission, he worked with Secord on a second rescue plan.

According to the October Surprise theory, Secord, North and Hakim did not intend Desert One to carry through. The miserable failure of Carter's Desert One rescue attempt may have been deliberate.


From wiki:

Major General Richard V. Secord, Retired, was a United States Air Force officer convicted for his involvement with the Iran-Contra scandal only to be exonerated after a 1990 Supreme Court case found the statute used to be illegal. He was born in LaRue, Ohio in 1932.

He graduated from West Point in 1955 and was then commissioned in the USAF. He was President of Stanford Technology Trading Group Intl., also known as the "Enterprise", a company involved with arms sales to Iran during the Reagan presidency.

Since 2002, retired General Secord has held the position of CEO and Chairman of the Board at Computerized Thermal Imaging.

Richard Secord was involved in the Secret War in Laos during the Second Indochina War. He flew close air support missions in VietNam in 1962, and was the CIA chief of tactical air support in Laos on detail from the USAF in 1966, 67 and 68. See his book, "Honored and Betrayed" published in 1992.

Secord was the USAF Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Iran from 1975-78. In this capacity he managed all USAF military assistance programs in Iran as well as some US Navy and Army programs. During this time he oversaw Project Dark Gene and Project Ibex. 9emphasis added]


Again from

V. The 1980 Presidential Election

The CIA helped the Reagan-Bush campaign to win the 1980 presidential election. Congressional investigations have revealed that active-duty CIA officers were working with the campaign.

Former agents of FBI and CIA used to gather political information from their colleagues still active in the two agencies. Under the direction of Reagan's campaign chairman, William Casey, Reagan's forces had infilterated Carter's camp with one or more spies. Casey and Bush were very popular with the CIA. William Casey operated an old-boy network of spies, and George Bush was director of the CIA during the Nixon Administration.

The CIA was down on Carter. Many agents were outraged by Carter-appointed CIA director, Stansfield Turner. He had had removed about 600 people from their jobs in covert operations, and he disciplined Theodore Shackley and Thomas Clines, two popular and powerful agents who were involved with some unsavory operations. (They were mixed up with Edwin Wilson, who sold explosives to Libya, and was associated with Secord through EATSCO.)[emphasis added]

The spies associated with the Reagan-Bush campaign played an important role on the Debategate scandal. The Reagan campaign had somehow acquired copies of briefing books used by Carter to prepare for the 1980 presidential debate.

On October 20, 1980, almost a week before the Carter-Reagan debate, Wayne H. Valis, a former aide to Mr. Reagan, sent debate briefings acquired from Carter's campaign staff, to Jim Baker, and David R. Gergen.

When the Debategate scandal broke in 1983, Edwin Meese 3rd and Michael K. Deaver denied any knowledge of political espionage in the 1980 presidential race. Neither of them remember anything about Carter's briefing book, or have any documents or records pertaining to the incident.

Meese insisted that the House subcommittee investigating the conduct of the 1980 presidential campaign have only limited access to the documents the White House wanted to provide, for fear that the committee would stumble upon important but unrelated documents. attempt to set up a criminal investigation was blocked by the Justice Department.

The Reagan-Bush campaign was afraid Carter would rescue the hostages and win the election. Before the election, there were many rumors and security leaks about "October Surprise" hostage rescue attempt. Richard Werthlin, Reagan-Bush 1980 presidential campaign pollster, determined that an "October surprise" would end their chances of winning the election.

On April 20, 1980, days before the actual mission, Mike Copeland ran a hypothetical hostage rescue story in the Washington Star that almost exactly predicted the real thing.

Members of the Reagan-Bush campaign formed the October Surprise Working Group, to keep Carter from bringing hostages successfully home. Richard Allen, Reagan's foreign policy advisor, was the head of the group. The group included William Casey, Reagan's 1980 campaign manager, who was later appointed CIA director. Casey was at the heart of the Iran-Contra Scandal, and died before he could testify. The group also included Vice Presidential candidate George Bush, who was eventually elected President of the United States in 1988.

Bush did not have any campaign or public appearances from the 21st to the 27th of October, a week before the election. (Why would they want to keep him out of sight before the election, like they did Dan Quayle?)

According to the October Surprise theory, members of the Reagan-Bush campaign cut a secret deal with the Ayatollah Khomeini, to keep the hostages from being released before the November 4, 1980 presidential election.

Richard Allen met with Robert McFarlane, and an alleged Iranian emissary, in early October 1980, in Washington D.C. They allegedly made a deal to delay release of the hostages until after the election. McFarlane and Allen acknowledge the meeting, but deny that a deal was cut.

Barbara Honegger, a researcher with the Reagan-Bush campaign in 1980, recalls being told then that "Dick cut a deal." i.e. Richard Allen. Mansur Rafisadeh, former Chief of SAVAK (the Shah's secret police), and CIA informer, said CIA elements loyal to Reagan arranged a deal to keep the hostages in Iran until Reagan was in the White House. [3] [25] Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr, president of Iran at the time of the alleged deal, said the meeting took place some time during the last two weeks in October 1980, and that Allen and McFarlane met with Hashimi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, who was the main Iranian contact in subsequent secret arms trading revealed by the the Iran-Contra Scandal.

An investigative subcommittee chaired by Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) is looking into contacts between Iran and the 1980 Reagan-Bush campaign.

VI. The Release of the Hostages

In October 1980, the Carter Administration finally negotiated an agreement between the US and Iran, to unfreeze Iranian assets for the return of the hostages. As a result, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is set up at the Hague.

On October 22, the Iranians' persistent demand of U.S. weapons was suddenly dropped. Bani-Sadr says the demands were dropped because there were two separate agreements: the official one with Carter in Algeria, and the secret one with the Reagan campaign, that the hostages should not be released during Carter's Administration. In return, Reagan would give them arms.

On Jan 20, 1981, Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President of the United States. The hostages were released moments afterwards.

Endgame … as far as Watergate, but many more games are to be played.



to be continued…

Written by Kris Millegan   
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